sympathize with roguery, and — just for the fun of the thing! — to thwart and delay all measures for its punishment) was unneces sary. Judge Porter, with several other mem bers of the bar, was called to Taylor's Hotel, in Jersey City, to advise tipon critical mat ters of law and tactics. On one of these visits he undertook to persuade the late Mr. to adopt a course which he thought the manly and right one. In re counting to me what he said, he repeated, "It is unfit that the reputation and character of should be threatened by the appearance of," etc. I asked Judge Porter what he had referred to in speaking of the reputation and character of . He looked at me in a startled way, and there came across his face an expression which indicated that for the first time it had dawned upon him that, as the basis of an appeal for right action, his client was lacking in the elements upon which his counsel relied, and would feel about as much pride in " reputa tion " — as decent people view it — as a tin ker in a leaky kettle which he has no motive for mending. There was something pathetic in the situation. The clear-headed, eagleeyed, resolute, and perfectly honest lawyer was without a word led to realize that he was advising a knave, to whom any appeal which honor would permit the lawyer to make would be fruitless. Judge Porter did not very long continue the adviser of that set of men. Perhaps he did not altogether suit them. It is certain that they did not at all suit him. He construed the duty of counsel to accept service very strictly, and would have regarded it a most unworthy and impertinent thing in a lawyer to determine in advance and against him the guilt of an accused person. His view of the part assigned in ours and the English system to counsel who represent others in court required him in almost every case to accept and not to decline professional employment. These principles were again tried when he was called upon by the representatives of

Messrs. Tweed, Ingersoll, and others, in dicted in 1870, for various acts of fraud and corruption in municipal affairs, to assume the responsible control of their defence. When he evinced some indisposition he was asked to name his own retaining fee, and at a second interview it was intimated to him that the accused would regard $50,000 as appropriate. If there was anything in this world Porter hated, it was a man like Tweed, who betrayed public trusts. He re alized that men who are dishonest in matters of public trust are more dangerous than ordinary criminals; and to him they were a thousand times more obnoxious and hate ful. He felt it his duty to communicate the appeal which had been made to him to his partners, after which it was, in strict accord ance with his own ideas, promptly and per emptorily rejected. In the case of Tilton against Beecher, he engaged in the defence of Henry Ward Beecher with the most hearty zeal, upheld by a belief in the innocence as well as the nobility and purity of character of his client, which was as positive and to him as comfort ing as his belief in his religion. He de fended with equal zeal and the same success General Babcock, private secretary of Gen eral Grant, who was indicted and tried at St. Louis for complicity in what was called the whiskey frauds. In the course of the trial, political friends of General Grant came to Judge Porter on one or two occasions, and excitedly remonstrated against the line of defence which he had taken, saying that it "implicated the President." Judge Porter was indisposed to render any account of his actions to casual strangers, and contented himself with saying that he had but one client, — General Babcock, — and that his sole aim and expectation was to acquit him. The jury was largely composed of ex-Confed erate officers and soldiers; and in his address to them Judge Porter told them he had been warned to tread lightly upon certain parts of the case, lest the reputation of Gen eral Grant should be drawn within the con