The Supreme Court of Indiana.

prohibitory law was in direct conflict with the fundamental principles of civil govern ment, as embodied in the Bill of Rights. It was then contended that the effect of this decision, in striking down the Act of 1855, was to leave that part of the Act of 1853 previously held valid in force; but here the advocates of temperance were doomed to disappointment; for the court held in a still later case (11 Ind. 482) that although the main part of the Act of 1855 was invalid, yet its general repealing clause was constitu tional, and had the effect to repeal the Act of 1853. A most absurd conclusion, it must be said, and one that savored of party sub servience; for the judges belonged to the party which opposed the stringent meas ures embodied in the Acts of 1853 and 1855. It is well to state that these deci sions have been in effect overruled. Another far-reaching decision was that in the case of the City of Lafayette v. Jenners (10 Ind. 70), in which the part of the school law authorizing cities and towns to establish public schools and to levy and collect taxes for their support was stricken down. The effect of this decision was far-reaching, and was a great blow to the public schools of the day. It is true that the court was continually asserting that the strong presumption was that an act of the legislature was constitu tional, that a law was not to be held invalid unless plainly in conflict with the Constitu tion, and that the court would hesitate long before striking down an act for that rea son; yet one who now reads the decisions then rendered cannot help entertaining the thought that the court in a measure consti tuted itself a court of revision for the legis lature, and struck down many acts that did not meet with its approval. " Public pol icy," even at that early day, was a subject of discussion in the opinions, and had its weight in determining the result. Yet it must be admitted that opinions were then rendered that have become landmarks in constitu tional law.

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Addison L. Roache resigned, and May 8, 1854, Alvin P. Hovey was appointed his successor. At the next general election, held Oct. 10, 1854, Samuel G. Gookins, a Republican, was elected as a successor to Judge Roache, — Hovey, a Democrat, not being elected to succeed himself. On the 15th of August, 1857, William T. Stuart filed with the Governor his resigna tion, dated the 4th inst., " to take effect on the first Monday of January next" (1858). At the next general election (1857) Horace P. Biddle was a candidate for the office vacated by Stuart, and received 20,000 of a majority; but Governor Willard refused to issue him a commission. Biddle brought an action for a mandate to compel the Governor to issue to him the commission; but the Su preme Court decided that at the time the election was held there was no vacancy; that the resignation was only prospective, and could have been withdrawn at any time before it was accepted, and after its accept ance, with the consent of the Governor, and that Biddle had not been duly elected. Bid dle was then a Republican, and the Governor and judges of the Supreme Court were Dem ocrats. Since then their decision has been greatly impaired by subsequent decisions. The day after the decision was rendered, — Jan. 15, 1858, —. Governor Willard appointed James L. Worden as Stuart's successor. On Sept. 22, 1857, Judge Gookins also resigned, to take effect when his successor should be elected; but the Governor de cided that this was no resignation. On the 10th of December following, the judge sent in another resignation, to take effect immedi ately; and on the same day James M. Hanna was appointed to fill the vacancy. The reason for Judge Stuart's and Gookins's resignation was the low salaries paid them by the State. When the court was reorgan ized under the new Constitution, the salary of a judge was only twelve hundred dollars. In 1859 the salary of a Supreme Court judge was raised to two thousand dollars, in 1865 to three thousand, and in 1873 to four thou