Questions tagged [universal-and-particulars]
17 questions
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Does nominalism about kinds/universals entail eliminativism/nihilism about ordinary objects?
If one holds a nominalist or conventionalist view of universals or kind, then do they believe that there are ordinary objects?
Craigory
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How can I unambiguously differentiate between universals and particulars?
I am posting this question here as the question is philosophical at its core, but is connected to formal ontologies (e.g. DOLCE) used in computation. My background is more in computation than philosophy, so please forgive me for the potential misuse…
O-U-O
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How do humans generalize abstract concepts from concrete objects?
To elaborate, I would like to take the definition of square as example, the square is shape with four equal sides and either two sides form a 90 degrees angle, while we can not directly see it. What we see is square with four 10 inches sides or…
Milligan
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Is generality transitive?
If A is more general than B, and B more so than C, is A more general than C? I would be tempted to think so strictly, but:
Supposing that a haecceity is something real, where does it fit into the range of things that there are? Is it, for example,…
Kristian Berry
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Examples of, or counterexamples to, the concept of erotetic inference?
Suppose that the generality-particularity ordering is the comprehensive ordering on inference. Compare:
What is the first integer after 2?
What is the first prime integer after 2?
(2) would seem more particular than (1). However, I would be…
Kristian Berry
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Logical Atomism and Simple Particulars
I read a bit of logical atomism by Russell, but would appreciate if someone explains with examples of what is meant by it. For example, it says that "[a]ccording to logical atomism, all truths are ultimately dependent upon a layer of atomic facts,…
george
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Kant and the Ship of Theseus
Does Kant's philosophy of perception and intuition imply that the unity of perceived individuals is an intuition? If so, this seems to resolve the various paradoxes of physical individuals such as the problem of change over time and the ship of…
David Gudeman
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"Too simple to be simple" (a phrase in category theory) and the concept of absurdity
In category theory as practiced, there is this phrase "generalized abstract nonsense" (GAN), which is often used to cover sections of a derivation/judgment(?) that the audience is meant to either understand or accept on the "authority" (not quite)…
Kristian Berry
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Is it possible to ask a completely generalized question?
Alternatively, are "absolutely" or "perfectly" generalized questions askable? Note that vs. the use-mention distinction, we can refer to questions that can be mentioned but never asked, so to say, which is the issue, then, here.
So considering the…
Kristian Berry
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Do general facts and general properties go hand in hand?
I'm thinking of general properties as normal abstract objects (whatever "normal" means, here). But so I have never been able to get at why there was this strong, recurring thread in esp. scholastic-style theology, in defense of, "For God, there is…
Kristian Berry
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Could the boundary between concrete and abstract objects be vague?
Though the SEP article on abstract objects has long weighed on my mind, I never formed much of an opinion about the question until now. The opinion I did have was negative: the ~space/~time definition was unsatisfactory, because we then have the…
Kristian Berry
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Do regresses-of-reasons go from particulars to generalities only, or can they mediate chains of just particulars or just generalities too?
I was thinking of Kant's discourse on the form of the law and the law of formality as reciprocal (in the Critique of Practical Reason), where he seems to talk about a regress from specific maxims to the pure CI:
It is therefore the moral law, of…
Kristian Berry
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Is nominalism generally considered to be disconfirmed?
In Are numbers particulars?, David Gudeman states "nominalist, which I don't think anyone is these days." I was not aware that nominalism regarding universal is generally considered to be disconfirmed and is by most excepted as false. If yes, which…
Make42
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If there are abstract cases of space and time, then why wouldn't all the other abstract objects be located inside of them?
As per the SEP article on abstract objects:
Some of the archetypes of abstractness are non-spatiotemporal in a straightforward sense. It makes no sense to ask where the cosine function was last Tuesday. Or if it makes sense to ask, the sensible…
Kristian Berry
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Ramsey's Universals: Why is "Neither Socrates nor Plato is wise" not a proposition of the form "x is wise"?
I am studying Ramsey's 1925 paper Universals, and he states that "Socrates is wise", "Plato is wise", etc. are propositions of the form "x is wise", yet "Neither Socrates nor Plato is wise" is not. It is instead of the form "$\phi$ wise" where…
tashakinns
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