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Questions tagged [self-reference]

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"Impredicative" definitions in mathematics

In this blog post, the following definition of an "impredicative definition" is offered: A definition is said to be impredicative if it defines an object E by means of a quantification over a domain of entities which includes E itself. An example: the…
Frank
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How should we characterize the logical structure of wishes?

The motivation for this question is extraordinarily stupid, but it requires just enough thought and specific knowledge of formal logic that I think it still falls within the broad scope of "philosophical logic." The basic problem is this: Given a…
R. Burton
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The origin of a particular self-reference paradox

This is a simple reference request, for the origin of a particular type of paradoxical statement. The example I remember is Roger Penrose can't consistently claim this statement to be true. It's a true statement, but if you happen to be Roger…
N. Virgo
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"I vow that this sentence be true," vs., "I vow that this sentence be true"

To try to "explain" why the liar sentence is "logically dangerous" whereas the Gödel sentence is "logically helpful," I tried out contrasting the differing "effect" that these sentences would have if "absorbed" into a Fregean One True Fact (). The…
Kristian Berry
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Kant's transcendental apperception and 'ipseity' in phenomenology

In the writings of various phenomenologists, the concept of 'ipseity' is widely discussed. As far as I can make out from various sources (e.g. Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, esp. chapter 5), ipseity is virtually indistinguishable from Kant's…
Bird
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Can we create a paradox of self-consciousness?

On the theme of Russell's paradox: Does the set of all sets that do not contain themselves contain itself? And the Barber's paradox: Does a barber who shaves all men who do not shave themselves shave himself? Can we formulate a similar regarding…
user17065
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Does the cardinal Yablo problem have the same solution as the ordinal one?

To quote Kant (as usual!): A quantity is infinite, if a greater than itself cannot possibly exist. The quantity is measured by the number of given units- which are taken as a standard—contained in it. Now no number can be the greatest, because one…
Kristian Berry
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What's (if anything) wrong with this argument for the non-existence of the self?

1: The self, if it exists, is a thing that receives and/or controls experience. Some aspects of experience it controls, other aspects it receives. But whether the experience is "controlled" or "received", the self as controller or receiver is…
Benjamin Grange
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The type of all types, the type of being a token

Do descriptions like those result in paradox or antinomy like "set of all sets" or (nLab seems to say at one point) "category of all categories" do? It seems that the type of types would be a token (or occurrence?) of itself. If it is a token, then…
Kristian Berry
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always false vs necessarily false , is it the same?

according to the basic tenets of classical propositional logic, contradictions are 'always false' tautologies 'always true'. When it is extended to modal logic we have the notions of 'necessarily false' for statements that are false in every…
Icon
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Can, "This problem is unsolvable," be used to formulate the first incompleteness theorem in erotetic logic specifically?

Assumptions/definitions: the Gödel sentence is informally equivalent to, "This sentence can't be proved in system X," where X is appropriately specified. Since that sentence can itself be created inside such a system, then, the system can be seen as…
Kristian Berry
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Is there some formal system of "first-person logic"?

The SEP article on indexicals mentions a lot of the seemingly logical complications that arise in connection with them. Indexicals are also comparable to variables and hence objects of schematism, so again there seems to be a "logical" quality to…
Kristian Berry
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Is there a conflict between self-reference and ontology? (In relation to mathematics)

I am a total layman when it comes to math, but I promise at least to clearly spell out my thought process. Some like Elaine Landry say "mathematics is not metaphysics" https://youtu.be/JiLUiEmhAJc. If I understand her at all (I probably don't),…
J Kusin
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Are actions self-referential?

Someone recently told me that "actions are self-referential" (which means that we do not have to specify a particular actor to know whether an action is possible or not). He made it sound as though I would be regarded as a moron if I rejected the…
John F101
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Assigning "self-awareness" to qualia as a necessary attribute

The teleportation question which I'm sure most of you have researched, If I replicate you atom for atom, which one of them will be you? The issue of materialistic basis for consciousness posits a paradox in this scenario. If consciousness is a pure…
Weezy
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