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Preface

("What isn't my question")
As prominently articulated by Mill, liberalism (and the harm principle) asserts that it is always bad for aggregate utility to coercively interfere in people's voluntary, self-regarding actions. As Mill did not obviously define what is self-regarding ("harmful"), there are various interpretations. For instance Rees (1960) suggested that Mill limited harm to the violation of rights that people ought to have. I'm personally not convinced that Mill's distinction between "offence" and "harm" was some arbitrary list of rights, as he explicitly defined "interest" in Utilitarianism as simply utility:

[...] the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole

Question

The point being assessments of harm are always comparative - to some baseline. In utilitarian ethics, "good"/"bad", "beneficial"/"harmful" semantically denote the utility of an action relative to another, whether explicitly stated or implied. One might say that it is good to adopt and travel by electric vehicles, relative to continuing to use internal combustion engines (for it may not be good compared to reducing private vehicle transport altogether and moving to other transport modes). So when referring to an action as "harmful", one is necessarily comparing it to another action with a higher utility. This raises the question of the right baseline to use when assessing "harm" in the context of the harm principle.

Using the example of "duty to rescue" laws, it seems logical that Mill would not compare an action to merely if nothing was done when assessing its harmfulness, for it would justify the absolute liberty to walk past someone suffering a cardiac arrest without helping, and render such laws illegitimate. I.e. If we define the baseline as merely doing nothing, liberalism would contradict with utilitarianism in situations where an action is equivalent to, or better than doing nothing, and there exists an even better course of action.

To reconcile with such scenarios, I have come to regard "self-regarding" as not negatively affecting the aggregate utility of others, compared to all other available courses of action in a given scenario (not worse than any other option). This clearly restricts liberalism's domain of application; but broadly defining "self-regarding" seems to make liberalism and utilitarianism contradict. Rather than flawed applications of liberalism, I think direct utilitarian reasoning better handles complex ethical questions where there aren't multiple, equally consequential options, all of which are equally best.

Edit: The SEP resembles my interpretation of Mill's conceptualisation - In discussing enforceable duties to give evidence or Samaritan aid, Mill claims that the failure to confer benefits constitutes harm.

Related question (doesn't address the harm principle): Is it OK to be indifferent or inactive when another is being harmed? Edit: I didn't use the right keywords. Found this when searching "harm principle baseline" - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-013-9235-5. Will add more info after I read it

yue-dongchen
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  • [Related](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/99578/how-do-we-decide-between-ethical-option-to-take), [also indirectly](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/97083/would-it-be-ethical-to-help-both-predator-and-prey?r=SearchResults&s=1%7C30.5234), [and](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/99548/would-it-be-ethical-to-prolong-the-suffering-of-other-beings?r=SearchResults&s=2%7C19.1429) – Reine Abstraktion Jun 04 '23 at 12:02
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    Could you highlight your exact question in the text, I can't see it atm – Reine Abstraktion Jun 04 '23 at 12:04
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    Please clarify your specific problem or provide additional details to highlight exactly what you need. As it's currently written, it's hard to tell exactly what you're asking. – Community Jun 04 '23 at 12:16
  • *If we define the baseline as merely doing nothing, liberalism would contradict with utilitarianism in situations where an action is equivalent to, or better than doing nothing, and there exists an even better course of action.* There is no duty to rescue in US law unless one has contracted to do so (lifeguard, police, fireman, EMS, doctor, nurse, etc.). If one acts, with or without a duty, then one must not make the victim worse off (must not do more harm than good). I have not read Mill. Voluntary action is utility to each individual forcing action reduces that aspect of individual utility. – SystemTheory Jun 04 '23 at 16:10
  • @SystemTheory Indeed a premise of liberalism is that restricting the liberty of voluntary action is always detrimental to the wellbeing of the object. So it prevents restrictions that do not increase aggregate utility to others. Mill presents liberalism as a necessary condition for utilitarianism, preventing some encroachments on liberty that are non-utilitarian. The SEP resembles my interpretation of Mill's conceptualisation - _In discussing enforceable duties to give evidence or Samaritan aid, Mill claims that the failure to confer benefits constitutes harm._ – yue-dongchen Jun 05 '23 at 00:39
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    I was taught that there are no neutral actions: everything affects oneself and / or others positively or negatively. So it is always possible to assess what is done. It just depends how much you want to interfere with people, or how urgent it is to prevent harm. – Scott Rowe Jun 05 '23 at 01:59
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    Well, given some kinda morally charged situation, there's only a fixed number of options a person has. Why not start there? – Agent Smith Jun 05 '23 at 05:08
  • Forcing unskilled person to rescue others as a matter of ethical custom or formal law might reduce aggregate utility because the unskilled rescuer might incur harm as well as the victim or might do more harm than good to the victim. Voluntary rescuers, whether paid as professionals or volunteering their time, tend to be motivated to gain skill in a chosen field. Although the idea is to optimize individual and/or group utility there are no good math models based on any measurements. Utility curves may be based on revealed preference but remain arbitrary math models with no means of measurement. – SystemTheory Jun 05 '23 at 22:58
  • I am an aging lifeguard. I used to attend men's retreat every six months. Each time a younger man, a fitness trainer, would exit the sweat lodge in the pitch dark then swim the cold lake. This is dangerous due to the rapid change in temperature from the hot sweat lodge to the cold water in Spring/Fall. I used to watch this man even though I was ten years older. It would be high risk for me to rescue him after sweat lodge. Then one night I said, "He is taking the risk. I am not on the clock". That night he crawled 10 yards on the sand from the lake to the campfire with serious muscle cramps. – SystemTheory Jun 05 '23 at 23:09
  • @SystemTheory "*Think of it as Evolution in action.*" – Scott Rowe Jun 06 '23 at 22:58
  • @ScottRowe I do not grasp the implications of your comment. My comments have to do with practical challenges humans have using skill to take risk. Forcing a person to rescue others in the effort to maximize collective utility would not be likely to produce the desired outcome because most people when forced to rescue another will not have the requisite skill in the factual conditions. As lifeguard I once told a facility manager if he passed out in the chemical fumes, I would not go down the short stairs to his rescue. He said, "You better not! Call the fire department! They have oxygen masks." – SystemTheory Jun 06 '23 at 23:37
  • @SystemTheory I was agreeing with you. Let people take responsibility for themselves. The Darwin Awards exist for a reason. – Scott Rowe Jun 07 '23 at 01:59

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