Or should the subjective state itself serve as justification in and of itself?
What I mean by this is: suppose you come across a claim A and a claim B. Let’s also assume that both claims results in disastrous consequences for you if true. Finally, let’s assume you feel more certain of claim A being false compared to claim B. This translates into you experiencing no fear with respect to A but some fear with respect to B.
Now, presumably, there are certain reasons in A that make you feel as if it is ridiculous compared to B. The question now is does this automatically imply that B is relatively a stronger claim. Or should your emotional/subjective states be themsleves justified?
How would a justification look like anyways. Let’s assume certainty is some sort of function of reasons. Let’s define it as C (certainty) = F (reasons). How does one know, if his C is high, whether he is justified in having a high level of certainty based on those reasons R? It seems that any justification may inevitably be circular.
It would be like asking why you feel certain that the earth is not flat? Any reasons you come up with can be further questioned infinitely until presumably you end it with “because I just feel certain.”
So the question is twofold: 1.) must one’s subjective sense of certainty in a claim by itself be justified? And 2.) Must one justify relative levels of certainty (I.e. feeling more certain of A compared to B)
If this isn’t fully understood, perhaps I can try to rephrase the question: How can one’s subjective sense of certainty be justified independently of the actual feeling/sense?
