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In Difference and Repitition by Deleuze, he comes up with 3 syntheses of time. The first being habitus, which is the conditioning of actual experience through pre-existing material patterns for the Subject to interact with. The second is the Bergsonist coincidence of the past in the present (pure memory), and the presentation of the virtual/actual distinction over the possible/real distinction. The third is the Kantian synthesis, in which the issue with the first two syntheses is that under them the only thing which repeats in future time is the Same, or the Eternal Return as commonly interpreted from Nietzsche.

However, this is when Deleuze proposes that the third synthesis in order to break from this eternal cycle of the Same is with difference, and he gives an interpretation of Nietzsche in which what survives the Eternal Return is difference in itself, thereby giving structure for future time for the Subject.

All of this I understand, but I do not quite know how this is justified. If this third synthesis was introduced in the same place as the first or second I'm sure that his conception of time would not require the Eternal Return. In addition, he implies in his writing that some sort of conflict is made within the subject from the first two syntheses, which does not seem apparent to me.

I am asking if any of y'all know if there is any sort of real justification or necessity for the third synthesis to be the third postulated in that series of syntheses, or how the assumption of the Eternal Return is necessary, as this is not obvious or intuitive for me and seems to just come from Deleuze's desire to quote Nietzsche and Kant.

Conifold
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TCoff
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    Perhaps since Parmenides the eternal return is a necessary assumption or conclusion for many philosophers, developed further by Nietzsche. In the first two syntheses the subject is trapped in either material pattern of habitus or the virtual/actual distinction coincidence of the past in the present as pure memory in a sequence lacking creativity, both are a form of eternal return. Deleuze's third synthesis is based on the insight of the formers to arrive at his proposed difference as not only metaphysical concept but a practical tool to confront eternal return, not Nietzsche's affirmation... – Double Knot Apr 29 '23 at 04:46
  • Yes, in some sense you are definitely correct that the first two syntheses are forms of eternal return when together, as it would be part of an endless cycle. However, these syntheses are supported in argumentation by the intuitive immanence of these syntheses for the Subject. I can in good faith believe in the "self-evidency" of the habitus as it constitutes human experience of time, and although I disagree with the 2nd synthesis, I can see someone else experiencing time in such a way described for the 2nd synthesis. However, what does not seem apparent to me is both the ordering of the... – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 04:55
  • syntheses as well as the justification for the 3rd synthesis, as the 3rd does not seem "self-apparent" and I cannot see how someone can have an intuitive concept of time as such either. Furthermore, Deleuze presents the 3rd synthesis as a problem-solution, which is a way of thinking he highly criticizes in his resistance against platonic representationalism. As such, the 3rd synthesis seems very ad-hoc and a nonsequitur when reading Deleuze's philosophy. Therefore I was wondering if separate formulations of the 3rd synthesis without the problem-solution Deleuze proposes are known, any sources? – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 04:59
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    The habitus is the most actual experience of the world. The second deals with the conditioning of that experience by pre-existing virtual patterns. The third synthesis, then, is the most abstract and conceptual, as it deals with the nature of difference itself and its role in the production of time and introduces the virtual and the singular as a means of breaking free from the eternal return. Deleuze prioritizes virtual over actual, singular over general, thus the ordering here makes sense. And you're right intuitionists use singular constructions instead of representations to solve problem. – Double Knot Apr 29 '23 at 05:27
  • Thank you very much for the references, I will check them out to gain a more thorough understanding. As for as the syntheses, is one to think of them as chronological from the perspective of the Subject? – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 05:40
  • However, it does seem to be that Deleuze resorts back to the problem-solution way of thinking about the circle caused by the 1st and 2nd syntheses when he proposes the third. Also, it does not necessarily make sense for his conception of time to be ordered in such a way. Could he not have just proposed that time is difference-in-itself as the 1st and only synthesis? Or some other variation? – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 05:42
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    Bergson further developed Kantian time in Deleuze's 2nd synthesis to allude to time is nothing but the virtual sustaining condition of the repetition (eternal recurrence) pattern, thus Bergson already finished the singular construction or metaphorization of time as an invitation to its completion. Ergo Deleuze's own 3rd synthesis is supposed to be more abstruse and conceptual concerning the *nature* of difference which precedes time or treating it as an emergent actuality from the 3rd virtual knowledge... – Double Knot Apr 29 '23 at 21:41

1 Answers1

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Deleuze's 3rd synthesis of time is clearly related to what Derrida is referring to in Heidegger: The Question of Being & History, (pages 180-181) quoted below. It can be connected to will and eternal return, since will is the motive force of any 'self-activation'.

To clarify what he calls Kant’s “obscure assertion” that “time affects a concept, in particular, the concept of the representations of objects” (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 133), Heidegger shows what time as pure intuition must signify: originarily, it can in no way signify affection of something by something, affection of a being by another being, affection of an existing subject by something outside it: because time is nothing, as such it cannot affect anything. It is affection of self by self. Auto-affection, a concept that is as incomprehensible as is, in truth, the movement of temporalization. This auto-affection as temporality is not a characteristic affecting transcendental subjectivity, one of its attributes; it is, on the contrary, that starting from which the self, the Selbst, the I think constitutes itself and announces itself to itself. Heidegger writes, [French] p. 244:

As pure self-affection, time is not an acting affection that strikes a self which is at hand (vorhandenes Selbst). Instead, as pure it forms the essence (Wesen) of something like self-activating (Sich-selbst-angehen as self-relating, to relate to self, angegangen werden zu können). However, if it belongs to the essence of the finite subject to be able to be activated as a self, then time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity. Only on the grounds of this self-hood can the finite creature be what it must be: dependent upon taking things in stride (angewiesen auf Hinnahme). (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 132) [GA 3, 1929]

Clarifying the connection of 'will' and 'eternal return', quoting from Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track [GA 5, 1943], pages 176 & 177.

As the essence of will, the essence of the will to power is the fundamental trait of all reality. Nietzsche writes (The Will to Power, no. 693, from 1888): The will to power is "the inmost essence of being." Here "being" is used in accordance with the language of metaphysics: beings in general. As the fundamental character of beings, therefore, the essence of the will to power and the will to power itself are not to be ascertained through psychological observation; rather, it is the other way round: psychology itself gets its essence, i.e., the ability to set and to recognize its object, only through the will to power.

. . . Since will is the overpowering of itself, no richness [Reichtum] of life will satisfy it. It has its power in overreaching [im Überreichen] - namely, in reaching over its own will. Thus it, as the same, is constantly coming back unto itself as the Same. The mode in which beings (whose essentia is the will to power) in their entirety exist, their existentia, is the "eternal return of the same." The two fundamental terms of Nietzsche’s metaphysics, "will to power" and "eternal return of the same," determine beings in their being in accordance with the perspectives which have guided metaphysics since antiquity, the ens qua ens in the sense of essentia and existentia.

Chris Degnen
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  • I really appreciate your response, and you have given me more reading material which I am greateful for. However, what you have listed seems to be mostly commentary on the will to power and the Eternal Return as Nietzsche is commonly interpreted as the return of the Same. I feel that this does not answer the core question which I asked in my post. Could you clarify how this directly supports the justification of the 3rd synthesis of time in a way which does not just assume the Eternal Return to be essential and places it specifically and necessarily as the 3rd synthesis? – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 09:18
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    @TCoff I can't comment on Deleuze's concept of *difference*, but starting from the Kantian point I can link will and will's recursion (eternal return) to 'self-activation' and the formation of time, and vaguely to "giving structure for future time for the Subject." It sounds like Deleuze is treading a very similar path to Heidegger, so my answer might clarify how eternal return relates in Deleuze's analysis. – Chris Degnen Apr 29 '23 at 09:31
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    Note Derrida refers to this self-activation and temporisation as 'incomprehensible' so I wouldn't expect much crystal clarity from Deleuze. Nevertheless, the statement "an interpretation of Nietzsche in which what survives the Eternal Return is difference in itself" is fairly comprehensible to me in the light of the quotes I have posted. Difference as one movement of the self in contrast to a prior 'movement': affect of self on self, brought about by will (as essence, not deliberative force or thought). – Chris Degnen Apr 29 '23 at 09:42
  • Okay I see more your point now. Maybe there is something within the concept of auto-affectation and how it relates to the progression of time as to where my answer lies? What do you think? – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 09:47
  • What is still confusing is that I believe in *Difference and Repitition*, Deleuze contrasts his conception of time from both "succession of objects" as well as the "succession of psychological states", which seems close to how this auto-affectation works. As such, how is it that this third synthesis would be different if it relies on Derrida's reading of Heidegger in which the auto-affectation seems to play the role of the succession of psychological states? Perhaps if he claims that the *difference* between the self-affected states is what causes the driving force is the unique conception? – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 09:58
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    @TCoff Re. what do I think: As Derrida describes, Heidegger makes a subtle addition to Kant's concept of phenomenological time to posit "time as pure self-affection" as "the essential structure of subjectivity" ie authentic time bound up with Dasein. This is in contrast to 'ordinary' time which can (in the ordo cognoscendi) *subsequently* be discovered, defined and measured. – Chris Degnen Apr 29 '23 at 10:00
  • Okay, this is becoming clearer. And so as such the driving force for the future is the difference of self-affected states, upon which it is then posited that this survival of difference constitutes the Eternal Return and therefore breaks the circle of the Same while affirming difference-in-itself as the primary force at the same time? – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 10:03
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    Auto-affection and authentic time seems to correspond to "succession of psychological states", although maybe more phenomenological than psychological. "Succession of objects" corresponds comfortably to ordinary time, out in the world. – Chris Degnen Apr 29 '23 at 10:05
  • I understand, but the rest of it makes sense as I worded it? – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 10:06
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    Re. "driving force" - that would be 'will' as primordial motivating force causing a 'state' of self to reflect or differ from its former state, thus making a difference, constituting (in some way) time. – Chris Degnen Apr 29 '23 at 10:09
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    https://philpapers.org/rec/DRODB Lol – Chris Degnen Apr 29 '23 at 10:16
  • What is your point with the link? Also, the self-affectation is connected to the relating of what is seemingly outside of oneself to oneself? (Instead, as pure it forms the essence (Wesen) of something like self-activating (Sich-selbst-angehen as self-relating, to relate to self, angegangen werden zu können)? – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 10:22
  • Are you an academic, by the way? This is a very complicated subject in my opinion and I haven't been able to find much on the syntheses. – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 10:30
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    Re. link, just funny. Re. auto-affection, you will find more in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphyiscs* p. 194-195. Re. academic? This is an area of interest of mine. Professionally I am an engineer and programmer. – Chris Degnen Apr 29 '23 at 10:51
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    Thank you so very much, everything is starting to fall in place :). You're fantastic, I'm sure you'd be able to publish in the area. I also do this from interest. At least now I have contributed something by having discourse on this question on a level at which I think it'll help others significantly again thank you for your help! – TCoff Apr 29 '23 at 10:54
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    You're welcome. Cheers. BTW I recommend Derrida's [*Heidegger: The Question of Being & History*](https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/26195574). – Chris Degnen Apr 29 '23 at 11:07