It is commonplace to see warnings in introductory philosophy texts about not confusing use and mention, but I can't imagine how any reasonably analytical thinker could make such an error, so I've never seen the point of this warning. I occasionally see an internet commenter accusing someone of such confusion, but in every case I've seen, the accusation was obviously wrong, and I've never seen an accuser in such a case make a serious effort to back up his claim.
It should be easy to prove that someone has confused use and mention. In order for a use/mention confusion to occur, the sentence would have to use a term, say X in two different ways, one of which which refers to X as a language token and one of which refers to an instance of whatever X refers too. For example:
Induction is a form of inference with three syllables.
It is easy to point out that no form of inference has any syllables because syllables are features of words, and forms of inference are not words.
My question is: are there any genuine examples from the history of philosophy where some philosopher has credibly accused another of a use/mention confusion? Or, failing that, are there clear examples of typical arguments that make such an error?
