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Started reading Spinoza's Ethics 2 days ago, and it has gone well so far. However, even with its definition at the start of Book II, I struggle to understand Spinoza's use of singular things in propositions after prop. 8.

In most of the demonstrations he uses argumenation along the lines of "Singular things are not in god's essence as they are not infinite, and hence neither in the essence of his attributes (as they are also their own cause and have necessary existence). Therefore man doesn't have necessary existence being a singular thing" However, I don't quite understand how singular things can still be, aka. be in god.

My confusion: Since modes are affects of god's attributes they must exist and be infinite. However, can a mode of a mode, or affect of a mode that is infinite be finite since the mode isn't a direct link of substance/god? Is that how singular things come to be? But since god is all encompassing, why aren't these then in his essence, and then have to be necessarily infinite and existant? How can they be "outside" god if god is the only substance, aka. all that is?

Clearly I'm getting something wrong, so any help would be appreciated!

AdamKJor
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  • See Appendix to Bk.I: "In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one : that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature ; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so ; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived ; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. " – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Dec 22 '22 at 07:35
  • Thus, individual things (particulars) are in God as *modes*: **Def.v** "By *mode*, I mean the modifications of substance", and **Prop. xxviii**. "Every individual thing, ... But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God ; for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; 1/2 – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Dec 22 '22 at 07:41
  • for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of God." 2/2 – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Dec 22 '22 at 07:41
  • See e.g. [Identity and Distinction in Spinoza's Ethics](https://philpapers.org/archive/CRAIAD.pdf) for Spinoza's *substance monism*. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Dec 22 '22 at 07:54
  • See also [Spinoza’s Modal Metaphysics: Finite modes](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-modal/#FinModFirPas): "What about finite things like furniture and people? [...] This is a notoriously difficult question facing Spinoza’s metaphysics, one that was raised by Leibniz just a year after Spinoza’s death (Leibniz 1969, 203). [...] How can Spinoza believe both that God is the cause of all things and that finite things follow only from other finite things?" – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Dec 22 '22 at 08:51
  • Indeed a singular being in itself as a mode of mode is relatively finite, consider an infinitesimal of even a short finite line segment exists and is singular and in the said segment not outside, yet not an essence of the same said segment... – Double Knot Dec 23 '22 at 17:04

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