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In this article, philosopher Evan Fales argues that the laws of physics establish that disembodied minds (such as an immaterial God, for example) could not influence the physical world. Is it true?

(The article can be read in the book Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. The book can be downloaded for free on Z-library)

  • This is obviously not a settled question since causal closure principle cannot logically imply God's existence or nonexistence, though famous logician Godel had conceived a modal logic proof but it's not from empirical physics laws. And we do know the 2nd famous western Enlightenment philosopher Spinoza had a maxim *there's nothing but God*, and Leibniz visited him in 1676 for discussions/clarifications and got both impressed and dismayed by his philosophy... – Double Knot Jun 26 '22 at 05:08
  • Your link doesn't have a copy of the paper. Do you have a source where people can read it? – David Gudeman Jun 26 '22 at 05:50
  • If you can't give us a link to the paper, can you characterize the argument in more detail? How does the author claim that science shows that unmaterial beings cannot influence the physical world? I assume it has to do with certain metaphysical assumptions about physical law. – David Gudeman Jun 26 '22 at 05:57
  • Whether or not God exists depends at least partly on how you define "god". Some people believe philosophy is all semantics. In this case, you say `an immaterial being such as God`, so you're only arguing against the existence of an immaterial God, not a God that has physical form. The strongest argument against that would randomness in quantum mechanics: there is no (known) force that makes a quantum particle follow a specific path, so it could be an immaterial being (at least in theory). – Barry Carter Jun 26 '22 at 13:58
  • @DavidGudeman The article can be read in the book _Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem_. The book can be downloaded for free on [Z-library](https://z-lib.org/). – JustAnotherInquirer Jun 26 '22 at 14:46
  • What is his evidence that the immaterial cannot influence the material? Anything more than his naturalism does not allow it? – Neil Meyer Jun 26 '22 at 19:04
  • Can an immaterial thought influence the physical world? In a talk, I saw John Searle say, "I think to myself, I'm going to raise my right arm. And my right arm goes up!" Now how exactly does that happen if the immaterial (a thought) can influence the physical? Unless you are starting by assuming physicalism, that thoughts are indeed physical. – user4894 Jun 28 '22 at 02:29
  • In what sense an embodied human mind, in a human body, is not a law of nature? If you deny that, there is no point in the question, else there is an answer. – Nikos M. Jul 18 '22 at 09:00
  • Is not the real question: can disembodied minds rule out the laws of physics? – Ryan Pierce Williams Aug 31 '22 at 23:33

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The very short answer is "no". Neither the article, nor physics, rule out the existence or agency of Gods.

Somewhat Longer Answer:

The author is trying to stake out a very peculiar position. Most Anti-spiritualists assert ONTOLOGICAL naturalism -- I.E., that there is no such thing as non-material. They generally concede that the methodologies of science and reasoning, which combine to form methodological naturalism, could be used to investigate whether spirits influence our world.

This author seems to have put himself in a box, however. He WANTS to assert Ontological naturalism, but admits that the test cases of abstract objects -- Poppers World 3 -- exist. He also admits that minds exist, and that he cannot rule out that they are world 2 rather than world 1 objects.

This leaves him searching for a justification for his belief in an effective ontological naturalism, and this effort to redefine methodological naturalism to exclude certain categories of hypotheses, is a very blatant kluge/rationalization. Note how he describes it:

it would be a mistake, I think, in the present context, to bind naturalism to a commitment that minds are material. That is arguably not something that science alone can settle, but however it is settled, we should not hold psychology and the social sciences hostage to the outcome. Thus I propose that the right sort of gerrymander here, to give us what matters, is one that rules out disembodied minds. Naturalism, then, is committed to there being none of those.

Note he admits up front, that he is "gerrymandering" the normal usage of methodological naturalism, to try to prevent study of subjects he wishes were not the case. The methodology of naturalism is not committed to excluding acceptance of certain answers of "what is our world like". His admission that whether minds are material or not is an open subject, but that he is ALSO excluding trying to answer this open question from any kind of scientific inquiry, shows exactly what this sort of ideological effort to constrain science leads to.

In prior centuries, the Church, or the Commissars, banned study of certain subjects because they contradicted their ideologies' dogma. Evan Fales is trying to do the same today.

Even More In Depth Answer

Fales makes an implicit assumption about science, and physics laws -- that science laws are ABSOLUTE LAWS, not regularities. This is clear in his discussion of conservation principles. But this is not how laws work in science. Laws are regularities. They do not always hold. A good discussion of how all science laws break naturally is in this paper: https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.93.25.14256

Not only are conservation laws not absolute, but causal closure for the physical is not a valid assumption either. First, it is simply inconsistent with science as an active and open field of inquiry. So long as we are still doing science, current science cannot be closed, and future science cannot exclude any logically possible causal paths.

Further, physicists do not treat causal closure as absolute, and cannot. It is not difficult to find examples of this. First, it is not possible to have any isolated system within the universe, as fields (gravitational, E-M) from outside will always cross any boundary. Hence one cannot have causal closure even within physics for any minimal physical system, other than our entire universe.

And for our universe as a whole, cosmologists basically have rejected causal closure. Whether it is the continuous matter generation of the Steady State Model, the spontaneous oscillatory excursion of "the equations don't exclude this" of low odds finally creating a universe from a void, the bouncing interaction of two adjacent brane-world universes, or the spontaneous spawning of baby universes in a multiverse universe -- cosmologists don't restrict themselves to conservation laws OR universes being causally closed.

Fales would have to say that cosmologists are not doing science, and banish them from the AAAS...

Aside -- Hoyle tried to find away to tweak the definition of conservation of energy to fit his model inside of it, and some Big Bang cosmologists have tried to do the same to say the spontaneous appearance of our universe in an instant did not violate COE. For a discussion of these efforts, and what they mean for COE and spiritual interaction, see this question and answer https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/494408/the-zero-energy-hypothesis-and-its-consequences-for-particle-creation-and-dualis

Note that expanding the "system" (to include consciousness, or Gods) and asserting a new term that is still conserved in the larger system, is a typical strategy that has been used in many of these past speculations.

And second, "matter" is only about 5% of the known energy of the physical part of the universe, with the rest in poorly or non-understood dark matter and dark energy. And finally, unless one is claiming that all subjects reduce to physics, and Fales explicitly rejects that, then real events and phenomena are characterized in disciplines OUTSIDE physics, and therefore physics CANNOT be closed to non-physics phenomena.

As a further challenge to fixed laws -- the current understanding of the Cosmological Constant is that its value is set by the energy of virtual particles, and the energy of these particles comes from the "laws" and constants of the standard model of quantum mechanics.

But our Cosmological Constant was very large in the first instants of the Big Bang, and it is changing today. So -- these "laws" have and are continuing to change.

Referring to the title of your reference -- Karl Popper defined pseudoscience as the act of claiming to be doing science, while rejecting the possibility of refutation.

Naturalism is, per the author here, the belief that consciousness, or any world 2 object like a God, cannot causally affect the physical world. Your author is trying to redefine science, so that any examination of the possibility of spirit causation is not allowed as a scientific inquiry. IE that his view of naturalism cannot be refuted by science. Popper would label your author an advocate of Pseudoscience.

Mark Andrews
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Dcleve
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  • In the first place, there are many flavours of dualism in philosophy and the author is just arguing against interactionist dualism. It's likely that the reason why he thinks science cannot judge **alone** whether minds are material is that some aspects of the question are philosophical rather than empirical, and I see nothing wrong with that. He's just saying that philosophy will be necessary to solve the problem. Check out [this article](http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2017/01/scientism.html) in which philosopher stephen law discusses the limits of science. – JustAnotherInquirer Jun 29 '22 at 16:30
  • Moreover, the author doesn't rule out the appeal to disembodied minds to explain phenomena in the physical world for dogmatic reasons, but because he thinks physics already established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they don't influence the physical world. A perpetual motion machine, for example, is not a logical impossibility, but it is extremely likely that no one will ever create a machine like that. – JustAnotherInquirer Jun 29 '22 at 16:30
  • [There is more than one way to state the law of conservation of energy](https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/255928/is-conservation-of-energy-only-for-isolated-systems). For discussions in philosophy of mind, what matters is just that **energy cannot be created or destroyed, it can only change form**. It is the local conservation of energy. An isolated system is not necessary for this principle to work. – JustAnotherInquirer Jun 29 '22 at 16:31
  • While energy may not be conserved or even defined in regions where space-time is not flat, this is not the case for the human body (or just the brain, if you prefer), where energy is well defined and locally conserved. Of course, if you apply a law beyond its domain of applicability, it will be violated. But so what? The fact that Newton's laws can't be applied to black holes doesn't stop engineers from relying on them for things on Earth. – JustAnotherInquirer Jun 29 '22 at 16:31
  • @JustAnotherInquirer -- I think you are looking for a dialog on interactive dualism and physics. Comments are supposed to be focused on ways an answer may be improved, or may have erroneous points, and most of these comments are well beyond that. I have created a chat forum for further dialog instead: https://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/137434/discussion-on-interactive-dualism We can discuss further there. – Dcleve Jun 30 '22 at 15:51
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Since the laws of physics says nothing about minds, it can't say anything about embodied minds, never mind disembodied minds.

Physicalists, who view everything as physics as the ground of everything, including both matter and the mental argue that the mental is nothing other than some emergent epiphenomena from the play of energy and matter in spacetime. Yet whilst this follows from their position, they have yet to describe, in detail, how the mental arises - other than simply positing by fiat. Some proponents point to AI as being conscious, but this proves nothing as the imitation of something is not the thing itself. Turing himself was conscious of this when he devised the Turing Test, but simply avoided the question. Avoiding a question is not answering it ...

Mozibur Ullah
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    The laws of physics regulate the behavior of matter. If minds interact with matter, this interaction can only happen if the resulting behavior of matter does not depart from physical laws. – JustAnotherInquirer Jun 29 '22 at 16:56
  • It’s worthy of note that the Turing Test fell out of favour as soon as obviously non-salf-aware AIs started to pass it, and Turing’s perhaps unforeseen corollary became apparent that if we are to grant human-equivalent rights to AIs that can, in conversation, pass themselves off as human then we should deny those rights to humans that can’t. – Frog Jul 18 '22 at 09:46
  • I like this answer against what I would call "mechanistic explanation". Would you agree, nevertheless, that a human mind embodied in a human body, is **a law of natur**e (by the very **definition of law of nature**, not necessarily reduced to "mechanics")? – Nikos M. Jul 18 '22 at 23:50
  • @NikosM: On the whole I wouldn't. Nothing I know about fundamental physics disposes me to the idea that consciousness can be explained by physics. To assert so is to take a certain metaphysical position. I'd be happier to state a human body follows natural laws or is an embodiment of natural law. The mind, less so. But in part, yes. – Mozibur Ullah Aug 20 '22 at 12:32
  • @MoziburUllah, ok. In my comment I am alluding to Poincare's explanation of the Michelson-Morley experiment "If Nature cospires to prevent us from detecting the speed of the aether, then this is a law of Nature" (quote paraphrase) – Nikos M. Aug 20 '22 at 15:30
  • @Nikos M: I'm not sure I see the connection. Poincare is talking about matter, space & time and whilst we are matter and live in space in time what is mental and conscious in us has not been shown to be derived solely from that. Poincare did not make the mistake of applying physical notions to describe mind, nor did Einstein or Heisenberg or Schrodinger. This appears to be very much a late 20C & early 20C position. – Mozibur Ullah Aug 20 '22 at 15:39
  • @MoziburUllah, the connection is that whatever mind is, the fact that is embodied in a human body is something that is happening and thus a law of nature by the definition of "law of nature" as that which happens in nature. Of course I see your objection to physicalism and mechanistic explanations (to which I agree to some extend), but I am saying this in a more general sense, as not super-natural. – Nikos M. Aug 20 '22 at 16:18
  • @Nikos M: Well, this is not how a law of nature is generally understood. An atom by itself is not a law of nature but exemplifies natural laws. A law of nature is generally quantified over substances that are alike. Like all atoms, all electrons, all magnetic fields. Likewise, even a single human, understood physically, is not a law of nature, but exemplifies natural laws, like having mass and volume, say. – Mozibur Ullah Aug 20 '22 at 16:24
  • @MoziburUllah ok this is a point of view, but I personally see no reason to restrict "law of nature" to that only. A special "law of nature" is still a "law of nature". The fact that science studies common patterns is irrelevant to the fact that not common patterns are also laws of nature. – Nikos M. Aug 28 '22 at 07:21
  • @Nikos M: No. Its not just a point of view, it's how laws are generally understood. They describe a genus, not one particular thing. – Mozibur Ullah Aug 30 '22 at 02:48
  • @MoziburUllah I see no problem to how physics likes to define "laws" with what I claimed. As I said the two facts are irrelevant. Science wants to apply to the most cases thus is no wonder that considers only common patterns under the name "law of nature". – Nikos M. Aug 30 '22 at 10:17
  • @MoziburUllah Moreover "genus" vs "singular thing" **is a vague and meaningless dichotomy**. A genus is itself a singular thing at a certain level. Furthermore, what about singular things that are a genus by themselves (ie genus of population of one)? Or other variations.. – Nikos M. Aug 30 '22 at 10:24
  • @Nikos M: No, its not. **A genus and a particular are technical philosophical terms**. The first means a collection whose members are admitted via a rule or law and the second means a particular, like a member. They are **not vague**. On the contrary yiu are using language in a very idiosyncratic way peculiar to yourself and supposimg it then to be philosophical. No, its not. Philosophy has its own language and if you are serious about philosophy then you should learn it. – Mozibur Ullah Aug 30 '22 at 12:57
  • @MoziburUllah your comment although correct on the surface, did not address the basic issue: that a genus can be composed of one singular thing. A priori excluding this, is arbitrary and really one cannot draw a line between how many things constitute a genus or not. So if a singular thing can constitute a genus, the distinction loses much of its dichotomizing power. That is all there is to it. – Nikos M. Aug 30 '22 at 14:50
  • @MoziburUllah see [my alternative answer](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/93309/14508) along these lines. – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 14:27
  • @Nikos M: Well, I don't have any arguments with your answer. That a genus can be taken to be a 'singular thing' rather misses the point of what genuses are about and why they stand in some contrast to particulars ... – Mozibur Ullah Sep 01 '22 at 05:31
  • @MoziburUllah thank you. To clarify, I said that any single thing can be "uplifted" into a genus, having this single thing as only element. There is nothing a priori stopping us from doing this. Then, since we can do this for any single thing, that a law applies to a gennus and not a single thing is not a no-go argument. – Nikos M. Sep 01 '22 at 06:38
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    @Nikos M: You're welcome. We're going to have to disagree on this. You're making a philosophical error. You can do as you suggest and many mathematicians have done likewise. But generally they would regard it as a "trivial" case and not emblematic of the proper sense. Likewise, a singular thing named as a genus, philosophically speaking, is still essentially singular rather than as a genus because its essential properties identify it as such. – Mozibur Ullah Sep 01 '22 at 06:44
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This sounds just like a person who is prefacing his beliefs by adding the sentence "Physics teaches that..." to give his beliefs more credence. There is the rather gaping issue of methodological naturalism that all hard science adheres to that this person so very conveniently forgets.

Science tells us nothing except that of which is. What exists in a reality beyond the physical is completely not in the magisterium (as Stephen Jay Gould would put it) that science operates.

It looks like there are so many people with a completely overlapping magisterium these days. They really should inform themselves over the article entitled Nonoverlapping Magisteria by Stephen Jay Gould. It was an incredibly important landmark article on the issue of how science and religion interact with each other.

I personally hold to a partially overlapping magisterium. Scientific discoveries have had a tremendous effect on religious thought in the last half of the 20th century.

The discovery of background radiation led to the belief that the first three words in the Bible was true after all. Funny how things turn out like that.

Neil Meyer
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    I think Gould's "NOMA" is nonsense. On a daily basis, religious people claim that magical beings interact with the physical world, and these claims [are surely vulnerable to scientific objections](http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2017/01/scientism.html). Besides, there's no scientific discovery that supports theism. In contemporary cosmology, some models predict a beginning of time and others don't. Most cosmologists agree that [it is unknown whether there was time before the big bang](https://iep.utm.edu/time/). – JustAnotherInquirer Jun 27 '22 at 02:34
  • However, even if one of the models that predict a beginning is correct, it would provide no evidence for god. As physicist Sean Carrol observes, [saying that the universe had a beginning is not the same as saying it popped into existence](https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1084183244273111040). It's not as if these models have a moment in which nature doesn't exist. – JustAnotherInquirer Jun 27 '22 at 02:34
  • @JustAnotherInquirer -- I agree that NOMA is incorrect. God hypotheses are testable. Note, however, your author's position, when taken to its inferred consequences, says they cannot be tested, because he insists that Gods must be epiphenomenal. – Dcleve Jun 27 '22 at 08:45
  • @JustAnotherInquirer -- to make my point above explicit, your author is arguing a POV that leads to NOMA. This is further implied in his quote: "That is arguably not something that science alone can settle", which implies separate, or at least only partially overlapping, magisterium. – Dcleve Jun 28 '22 at 16:55
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I would like to offer a different answer on this.

First of all, relying on current physical theories means one accepts that they are adequate enough or complete, which is not the case. So I will leave this path and base the answer on something else but close to that.

What we do know about minds (eg human minds, animal minds , ..) is that they are embodied in bodies. This is a fact. A fact of nature in this world if you like.

Another fact we know about these minds is that they are recognized, among other things, by their actions and consequences upon other things(*). This means that such a recognized mind needs some matter-energy substratum (ie a "body") in order to manifest its consequences.

Can a mind have manifest consequences without a matter-energy substratum (ie without a "body")? This is an interesting question, but the simple and at the same time profound answer is no. Why? Because once one defines these manifestations, at the same time one provides (even unintentionally) an alternative definition of what a "body" or matter-energy substratum can be. So we come back to previous point.

A mind without consequences on this world, is equivalent to being non-existent. We don't lose anything by taking it as non-existent.

(*) If mind is only an epiphenomenon of matter, then by definition it is always embodied regardless producing consequences or not.

So to sup up:

Either a mind has consequences on this world, which when defined and measured provide a definition of a matter-energy substratum (a "body" to operate), or mind is an epiphenomenon of matter-energy thus always embodied by definition, or it has no consequences, in which case it can be taken as non-existent (for this world) and absolutely nothing is missed.

In this sense, the arguments in your reference can be taken as true.

Nikos M.
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    +1. _It is not the case that the proposition is not true_. – RodolfoAP Aug 31 '22 at 14:50
  • Claiming that minds cannot be disembodied is a CLAIM, not a "fact". Millions of mystics over human history know your claimed "fact" is false. – Dcleve Aug 31 '22 at 15:03
  • @Dcleve I stated facts about embodied minds and then argued against disembodied minds with manifest consequences. If there is some logical error in that is something to point out. Mystics have claimed from time to time all conceivable things, obviously not all of them can be true. – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 15:06
  • 3rd paragraph, "they" is an invaldi inference. All embodied studies show is "at least some" not "they". If you propose to go further, you need to test the assumption, with Popperian falsification testing. You have not done that, and dismiss the methods to do so with hand waving. Mystics, reincarnation studies, remote viewing -- lots of methods are available to test your presumed speculation beyond your data. – Dcleve Aug 31 '22 at 15:16
  • @Dcleve can you be specific and reference the studies you mention and in what way are they contrary to that paragraph? PS: A logical argument has nothing to do with Popperian falsification (in case someone adheres to that framework) – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 15:39
  • Nicos M, you did not present a deductive logical argument in paragraph 3, you instead made an inductive one, in which you leaped to a generalization "they" which asserts universality from your observations, which is beyond the data of your having observed embodied consciousnesses. Empirical inference is only valid if you then go test it -- looking for passed falsifications not confirmations. It is far to easy to "confirm" false generalizations, we are wired to think via confirmation bias. – Dcleve Aug 31 '22 at 15:53
  • The spontaneous past life memories of children documented in case studies at UVa, past life hypnotic regression data (Helen Wambach, Michal Newton, are two published I have read), remote viewing studies that gathered valid intelligence data for the CIA, commonality studies across cultures for shamanic visions, there are multiple avenues of research you could look at for test cases. – Dcleve Aug 31 '22 at 15:58
  • @Dcleve I am afraid (despite your downvote) that the examples you mention are not clues to disembodied minds. Paragraph 3 states a fact we know. Then the argument in paragraph 4 explains why other variations can be taken back to paragraph 3. Which then concludes the argument. – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 16:38
  • @Dcleve The argument is quite simple: Either a mind has consequences, which when defined and measured provides an alternative definition of a "body". Or it has no consequences at all, in which case can be taken as non-existent and absolutely nothing is missed. And of course all minds we do know up to now are indeed embodied. QED. – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 16:49
  • Nikos -- that SOME minds are embodied is a fact. That all are, is a postulation. Your denying this difference is a failure to understand your own argument, despite it being pointed out to you. One which is contradicted by the examples I cited. You may dispute those examples, but that makes the inference disputed, at best. No, paragraph 3 is not "fact". – Dcleve Aug 31 '22 at 17:33
  • @Dcleve we don't disagree on some (that we know) are indeed embodied. The all part is an argument not a postulation. And the argument is justified. If you don't want to see this, then i have nothing more to say. The answer did not postulate embodied minds it argued for embodied minds. – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 18:56
  • @Dcleve the argument (which compléments paragraph 3) is in paragraph 4. If you want me to rephrase par3 i have no problem, but I hope you see the argument which is in par4 regardless if you agree with it, ideologically or not. – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 19:01
  • @Dcleve i rephrased par3 according to your comments. I certainly acknowledge that people have various metaphysical and ideological positions and may disagree with this answer, but an argument is there. – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 19:09
  • Nikos -- there is no "argument" involved in the extrapolation from "some" to "all" in paragraph 3. Instead the extrapolation is a hidden implicit assumption, unevidenced and unargued, which is falsely label as a fact. Paragraph 4 and 5 do not follow from paragraph 3, they rely upon a different unsupported claim that minds are epiphenomenal unless embodied, which is DIFFERENT from what paragraph 3 implicitly assumes (that all minds are embodied). I am glad you are finding this commentary worth editing over, that is the purpose of comments. – Dcleve Aug 31 '22 at 19:14
  • @Dcleve i think there is a misunderstanding. Paragraph 3 talks about the minds we do know. Paragraph 4 (can mind have consequences without body) is an argument that once these consequences are defined one can call them "body". It is a very simple argument. There is no mention of epiphenomenalism or the nature of mind. Only that it is bound to have some body without going into further details. Don't read too much into the answer. – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 19:19
  • Nikos, this statement "mind needs some matter-energy substratum (ie a "body") in order to manifest its consequences" is an explicit claim that disembodied minds are epiphenomenal. Epiphenomenalism for disembodied minds is a different claim and argument than necessary embodiment. Epiphenomenalism is a pretty direct consequence of assuming physics causal closure, which the OP assumed, but you appear to reject as unproveable. Paragraph 5 takes the epiphenomenal argument of paragraph 4, and asserts if minds are then causal, they must have "bodies", admitting this may redefine the bodies of p3. – Dcleve Aug 31 '22 at 19:32
  • @Dcleve no this is not what is said. If mind is an epiphenomenon of matter then it is always embodied by definition. If mind is not an epiphenomenon then it must have consequences on matter-energy, and these when defined enable to define a "body" for this mind. If mind has no matter-energy consequences and is not an epiphenomenon then it is equivalent to something non-existent. And we lose nothing by taking it to be non-existent. That's all. – Nikos M. Aug 31 '22 at 23:12
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We can say as Sean Carroll does that God Is Not A Good Theory.

There are two sources of issues that I think will prevent any final, totalising resolution here though.

(1) On the religious side, the fundamental flexibility and ambiguity in how god/s are defined. This has led to the framing God of the Gaps, a deus ex machina to reconcile any plot holes in the scientific narrative, whether abiogenesis or the source of the Big Bang. Whatever source of doubt, like asking if we can somehow conclude there must be a Creator, how did they arise, just gets contorted around by those determined to believe.

The diversity of views within modern Christianity, even the diversity held just among modern Catholics, would have triggered Inquisitions and heresy charges as little as two centuries ago. Iterations of the fine points of doctrine were powerful political tools in the past, but after being forced to accept secular governance by the expansion of religious wars following the arrival of the printing press, religion has become largely a private recreation.

In Islam and Judaism it is made very explicit that God is beyond our ability to imagine or define, a difference that I think has kept those traditions more vital, but also seen them generate less philosophy (still plenty, but less).

(2) On the scientific side, the source of issues is that experimental knowledge is necessarily tentative, and relational, contextual, and subject to revision. Proof belongs in mathematics, not physics.

Even in a causally closed universe where an immaterial being can't directly tracably impact causality, there can be indirect influences involved, retroactive narratives made about divine purposes come good in the end. But conversely, you might be surprised to find there are scientifically compatible framings of a deity, like the idea of an Omega Point (obviously, debatably, but Tipler's picture satisfied David Deutsch as possible even if not actual).

A physics-plausible deity would face limitations. An outside-physics deity would be undetectable, even if with theological tools like immanence and inspiration through faith they can be meaningful to theists.

I see the reduction of how we understand religions to them being sets of statements about reality and cosmology as a fundamental mistake, though. Following Durkheim, we can see religious behaviour as fundamentally about social cohesion, the system of finding group cohesion through enactment of values held sacred or put (at least for now) beyond question. In this framing we can understand 'religious entrepreneurialism', and Scientism.

We should shift the debate from, what is true, to what do beliefs do for us, and are their consequences good?

Holding habeus corpus, or universal human rights, to be sacred has unfolding complex impacts. I go into detail about how we need to reform rather than sever cultural traditions here: What are some philosophical works that explore constructing meaning in life from an agnostic or atheist view?

Mark Andrews
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CriglCragl
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    This answer is more a standard anti-Christian diatribe than an answer to the question. It goes off on several tangents unrelated to the question--all typical atheist hobby horses, it makes several controversial claims as if they were matters of fact, and ultimately, it does not address the question. – David Gudeman Jun 26 '22 at 05:54
  • Define God in a way that a collective group of randomly selected top level experts across fields will agree to, can be measured to rule out all other explanationa, get rid of confirmation bais, is repeatable and reproducible, is absolutely open to scrutiny regarding work and process, and then we will talk. That is no diatribe, just effort to get off the couch, head out of the book, and get to work. – Aaron Jun 26 '22 at 11:27
  • @DavidGudeman: The answer is a clear 'No.'..? – CriglCragl Jun 26 '22 at 11:38
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    @Aaron: 'Top level experts' - of which sect?? You *might* get Catholic leadership & theologians to broadly agree, but their picture of the trinity is, unclear at best. Their beliefs do different things for different Christians, so they aren't going to agree. Consider Gould's picture, that religion is in the discourse of values & morality, not facts: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-overlapping_magisteria – CriglCragl Jun 26 '22 at 11:45
  • A random member of the top offices of the Catholic Church, Orthodox, Sunni, Shia, Buddhist, Hindu, Academic Deans.... No single dominant selection within a group... The fact that they don't agree is the point. No pope should discuss quantum spin in the way of Max Planck Society member... At the end, introducing a god upon physics is the old bugaboo for generations, whereby god is found in discourse, yet eventually explained out of the realm physics with greater insight. It's more honest to end this hamster wheel with 'I don't know right now' and deal with the uncertainty that creates a god. – Aaron Jun 27 '22 at 13:07
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    I agree with DavidGudeman. @CriglCragl doesn't directly address the article, so his answer isn't very helpful. – JustAnotherInquirer Jun 27 '22 at 14:32
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My first doubt regarding this questions is whether physics rule in embodied minds. I think you will have to add other subjects for doing so. If this is true I can't find any significance to this question.

Evan Fales argues that the laws of physics establish that disembodied minds (such as an immaterial God, for example) could not influence the physical world.

When physics proves embodied mind emerges from disembodied mind this argument will fail. We cannot confirm whether this will never happen.

This article might give some ideas about mind: Is the Mind Immaterial or Material?

Does the mind effect the physical world?

Physics deals with only a few areas of our physical / ephemeral world. It cannot explain clearly anything immaterial. In other words, it cannot confirm or prove anything immaterial.

If physics has developed from something completely physicals, that limitation will always be there. Nobody can blow it off. The limitations of our senses and instruments also prevent us from doing so. If an ‘immaterial being’ such as God cannot influence the material world, we can say that the material world is influenced by an unnamed 'something' that is beyond the laws of physics and it must be something material. Even then physics cannot rule out that 'something' though it has not yet been proved to be material or immaterial. So the laws of physics cannot rule out (an immaterial) God

Different ideas related to the concept of God do not suit here.

Glorfindel
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