The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy in the article for happiness says:
In the face of these and other objections most commentators have concluded that neither happiness nor any other mental state can suffice for well-being.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/happiness/#DouAboValHap
"These objections" refer to the arguments that well being relies on non-mental conditions (exemplified by the Experience Machine thought experiment) and that a subjectively enjoyed life in impoverished conditions such as slavery are unsuitable for being well.
I'm deeply skeptical of the idea that well being is anything but mental based on my own life experience, and find the idea that well being is mental to be the most straightforward explanation of it, but am open to new arguments as always. Unfortunately, the given arguments in the article underwhelm me.
I'm very curious to hear whatever other families of objections exist which might persuade or enrich me. What might they be? Or do all other objections fall under the two "clusters" mentioned in the article?
