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Panpsychism is sometimes stated as: All matter is conscious

What is meant by matter here? For example Philip Goff said:

The basic commitment is that the fundamental constituents of reality — perhaps electrons and quarks — have incredibly simple forms of experience

He included only fermions and not bosons, is this common in panpsychist philosophy?

ArAj
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    From context in [Goff's The Case For Panpsychism](https://philosophynow.org/issues/121/The_Case_For_Panpsychism), he means *ponderable* matter, of which electrons and quarks are fundamental constituents. The reason for excluding fields (and hence photons and other bosons) seems to be caution about evidence. While we observe ponderable creatures that are uncontroversially conscious (humans), we do not observe even animals made of electromagnetic fields and the like. If we were to come across such creatures, as in Star Trek, Goff would presumably extend "subjective experience" to bosons too. – Conifold Sep 13 '21 at 19:41
  • I’m voting to close this question because it amounts to scientific speculation – Swami Vishwananda Sep 14 '21 at 04:58
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    @SwamiVishwananda How is "do panpsychists commonly hold X?" either scientific or speculation? OP is not asking anything about X itself. – Conifold Sep 14 '21 at 08:40
  • @SwamiVishwananda, given the actual fact of consciouseness, this question is way less speculative than eg a question about the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics where no such fact holds – Nikos M. Nov 04 '21 at 17:30

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I wouldn't read too much into that. He refers to "the fundamental constituents of reality," which would include all types of particles. Electrons and quarks are only given as examples. If he meant to exclude bosons, he would have said so.

In the interview where he said this, he goes on to say:

And the very complex experience of the human or animal brain is somehow derived from the experience of the brain’s most basic parts.

Bosons, such as photons, are necessary for the physical function of the brain. Thus, if his premise is that consciousness of the brain is derived from the consciousness of its functional parts, he would have to include photons as functional parts and therefore having some simple consciousness.

causative
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I suspect he may be excluding photons, which don't experience time. Other force carrying bosons like gluons also seem very simple.

There are many flavours of panpsychist, and more serious modern proposals like OrchOR focus on specific properties of fundamental phenomena, typically systems capable of generating complex behaviour.

Buddhism or at least the Yogacara school can be argued to be panpsychist, but places things like particles within mind. For Buddhist thought 'unencumbered' awareness has a deep universality.

CriglCragl
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  • OrchOR isn't panpsychism, nor is it credible! The brain is too warm to be a quantum computer. Also, advances in neural networks, like GPT3 or AlphaStar, show that quantum entanglement is not necessary to produce highly complex cognitive functionality. – causative Sep 13 '21 at 18:22
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    The link provided in this answer seems to have a very dubious grasp of physics. Also, I note, for what it's worth, that this answer misspells the words "panpsychism" and "panpsychist". – Daniel Asimov Sep 13 '21 at 23:06
  • @causative: Hossenfelder in her criticism, says "Orch OR is panprotopsychist in its assumptions". Tegmark had to retract the claims in his paper on OrchOR being unworkable: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orchestrated_objective_reduction#Decoherence_in_living_organisms The idea quantum states just can't influence biology is ludicrous, when chlorophyll production is one of *many* examples of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_biology – CriglCragl Sep 13 '21 at 23:14
  • @DanielAsimov: Is that really the level of your engagement? – CriglCragl Sep 13 '21 at 23:18
  • @CriglCragl That one of Tegmark's earlier criticisms was inaccurate does not prove the theory right; the same article mentions that the proposed mechanism yields coherence far below the 25 ms proposed. In your link on photosynthesis, it says photosynthesis might (unproven) involve coherence on the time scale of 60 femtoseconds, again far below what is proposed for Orch OR. – causative Sep 13 '21 at 23:28
  • @CriglCragl Can you cite the "panprotopsychism" comment? I found https://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/01/electrons-dont-think.html?commentPage=2 where the comment is made by someone named "Tam Hunt." Anyone who wants to physically explain consciousness needs to say that human consciousness somehow arises from complex physical interactions; OrchOR is just another theory that says "sufficient complexity yields consciousness." Show me a quote by the creators of OrchOR that it assigns consciousness to subatomic particles. – causative Sep 13 '21 at 23:40
  • @causative: Ah apologies, you're right it wasn't Hossenfelder. – CriglCragl Sep 13 '21 at 23:45
  • I have to agree with Daniel here. I noticed that the article linked uses the phrase "[f]rom the perspective of a photon," which is problematic, because it doesn't really make sense to talk about the perspective of a photon as explained [here](https://physics.stackexchange.com/q/54162/195139). – Sandejo Sep 14 '21 at 00:20
  • @Sandejo: It's widely used in physics to say photons don't expetience time, for instance by (Nobel winner) Roger Penrose in his discussion of Conformal Cyclic Cosmology. Framing discussion illustrating why we come to this perspective in lay-persons terms here: https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/193765/if-photons-dont-experience-time-how-do-they-account-for-their-gradual-change – CriglCragl Sep 14 '21 at 10:33
  • photons exist through time, in fact a photon may be created at a certain time when an electron and a positron interact. The phrase "photons don't experience time" is at best misleading – Nikos M. Nov 04 '21 at 16:58
  • @NikosM.: Did you read the link? – CriglCragl Nov 05 '21 at 00:01
  • I am aware that some claim this, i only say it is misleading. For example photons don't have mass, yet they have momentum, it is not that simple. See my own answer. – Nikos M. Nov 05 '21 at 07:15
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If electrons are conscious I would think photons are conscious entities as well in order to preserve a principle of mental conservation which may be the flip side of matter-energy conservation. Photons can become particle / anti-particles pairs which can then annihilate back to photons. The mind of the photon becomes the minds of the electron positron pair. The physical conservation is backed by mental conservation. What is the inherent nature of particles? Possibly they are minds - subjective points of view on their local environment.
see panpsychism and real mental causation and scientific animism

  • Photons are their own antiparticle. Do you mean positrons? Or protons? Why would there be a 'principle of mental conservation'? The principle of conservation of information (basis of the blackhole paradox) seems more to the point. Discussed the issue of our bias towards narratives from points of view here: 'Is the idea of a causal chain physical (or even scientific)?' https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/70930/is-the-idea-of-a-causal-chain-physical-or-even-scientific/72055#72055 – CriglCragl Sep 16 '21 at 12:45
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Almost all positions of panpsychism claim that an aggregate of objects does not constitute a distinct experience by itself. This position is not a contradiction, as long as the objects themselves can have experience. For example, one does not think of a group of people as a distinct conscious entity apart from the actual people themselves.

Excluding bosons from having this attribute, does not invalidate the claim of panpsychism, nor invalidate any consciousness conservation law, if there is such (whatever the case).

For example a Cooper pair of electrons behaves as a boson, while at the same time it is an aggregate. On the other hand, a photon can also be expressed as a kind of interaction between an electron and a positron.

So aggregates behave as bosons and bosons may be aggregates, thus it is dubious whether it consists of a separate experience apart from what the electrons themselves may have.

Note that there are conditions, under which an aggregate, can be a distinct conscious entity, eg all biological organisms, humans among them, are types of aggregates. So this claim is not absolute.

Nikos M.
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