Immorality of inconsistencies

Question

I am trying to find some arguments on the immorality of inconsistencies. To me it seems quite intuitive to conclude that an inconsistency is immoral (for example, 'Grass is green and grass is not green' is an odd result, so it must be immoral), but I find it hard to come up with solid arguments.

Answer 1

It is odd to describe inconsistency as immoral, but perhaps you are asking about the normativity of logic. This is a fairly hot topic in the philosophy of logic at present. Traditionally, logical rules and principles have been regarded as things one ought to follow in order to reason well, or as the rules of good thinking. The words 'ought' and 'good' are also used for making moral judgments, so there is an analogy with morality.

The normativity of logic is concerned with a range of questions. Is logic really normative at all, or merely descriptive? Is logic about belief and reasoning, or is it "the science of truths" - an account of how the truths of propositions relate to each other independently of how we think? Is there a single logic that is correct that we ought to use, and if so, which one? Can we accept a plurality of logics, and if so, how do they coexist? If there are normative principles that govern how we ought to reason, how do these relate to the rules of implication that appear in formal systems of logic? Even if inconsistency is bad, what is inconsistency exactly? Is it something specific like a contradiction in a formal system, or some broader concept of incoherence that allows for conflicting beliefs and paradoxes?

If you want to follow up on this subject, a good start would be to read this article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Answer 2

Morality involves the word "should." We can say "you should not torture for selfish pleasure." And we can also say "you should not believe inconsistencies."

Morality involves a sense of repugnance towards immoral acts. Torturing for selfish pleasure is repugnant. And it is certainly also repugnant to me to hold inconsistent views myself, and it is repugnant to me that others would hold them, especially if others take action based on those inconsistent beliefs that affects me. Somehow, the idea that harm might be caused based on a false pretense, instead of a mere accident, makes the harm seem more immoral.

Lying leads to inconsistencies, and lying is widely acknowledged to be immoral. Is the mere act of lying immoral, or the inconsistencies that result in the mind of the victim? One may say, the latter.

Determining morality from a philosophical standpoint is largely about resolving inconsistencies in our sense of repugnance, developing a framework that prescribes behavior in a consistent way.

We say that humans have moral value, and that intelligent animals such as chimpanzees have some, but less intelligent animals like grasshoppers have little. It seems that we assign moral value to minds, and the greater the mind, the more value we assign. What makes a mind great? A mind is greater when it understands more of the world. A mind full of contradictions is absent understanding, holding instead false understandings. A clear window to the world has moral value, a smeared and clouded one has less.

What ultimately matters for moral reasoning, for you, is what prescription for behavior makes sense to you, or what would make sense to you if you understood better. If a prescription for behavior does not make sense to you, you will not hold it, and if it does make sense to you and you understand it, you will hold it. In order to properly understand, and thereby select a moral code, you must resolve contradictions.

Answer 3

The statement "Grass is green and grass is not green" sounds odd, but it does have its merits, so it should not be considered immoral.

On the face of it, it is a contradiction. Between the lines, it implies that reality is not as simple as we think.

Grass is not always green (e.g. when it's dry), not all parts of grass are green (e.g. the roots or the seeds), some kinds of grass may not be green at all.

This is nitpicking and it doesn't make the statement "Grass is green" false. But it tells us that there is some inaccuracy about it.

Vagueness occurs when there are borderline cases. Borderline cases can have truth-value gaps (you can't say it's green, but you can't say it's not green either) or truth-value gluts (it's green, but it's also not green). In other words: there is often a contradiction at the center of a borderline case.

So the merits of an inconsistent statement could be that it points us to inaccuracies, ambiguity or vagueness, and thus to the limitations of our argumentation.

Further reading: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Vagueness