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I will make it clear beforehand, that the little bit I know about Aristotle is from Aquinas (secondary material) and Deleuze (Difference and Repetition), so there may be some misunderstandings on my part.

Anyway, the reason why Aristotle cannot say that Being is the uppermost genera (above all the categories) is because of the difference. Basically an animal can be rational or winged - but substance is only the animal, man or a bat. However, there's difference (rational or winged) which is still a Being but doesn't fall into the categories. However, isn't rational or winged just Quality?

Rajan Aggarwal
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  • Aristotle can not say that there is a single highest genus (being or any other) because it would have to be differentiated by something that falls outside of it, and hence not be the highest. But since he has ten highest genera what exactly precludes rational and winged from falling under one of them, say quality? – Conifold Aug 26 '20 at 12:37

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isn't rational or winged [specific differences] just Quality?

You seem to be arguing for or implicitly assuming monism*, as though there were only one substance called "being" and the differences between substances really accidental or illusory.

Quality is an accident, but specific differences (differentiæ) pertain to substance and essence.
cf. this chart of categories

St. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes substantial or essential differences from accidental differences, showing that the former is known by the latter, as cause is known by its effect:

De Ente et Essentia, cap. 4:

For even in the case of sensible things, the essential differences themselves are not known; whence they are signified through accidental differences which rise out of the essential ones, as a cause is signified through its effect
In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsæ differentiæ essentiales nobis ignotæ sunt, unde significantur per differentias accidentales, quæ ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectuum

cf. the other quotes in this answer to the question "We know substances by means of their accidents?", which discuss differentiæ.

*Monism is false because change exists, pace Parmenides; cf. Part II of Essence & Topicality of Thomism.

Geremia
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  • I was making a point that specific differences (accidents if you will) are nothing but particulars of Quality. They do pertain to substances - the primary category to which all other categories are said of (there is a difference in Sense).The problem Deleuze is tackling here though, was there is no concrete knowledge here (Hegel says something similar) when it comes to particulars. Isnt "essence" of a substance not just assumed here implicitly? – Rajan Aggarwal Aug 25 '20 at 17:58
  • @RajanAggarwal "_there is no concrete_ [do you mean scientific?] _knowledge here_ […] _when it comes to particulars_" That's true; "our intellect knows directly the universal only" ([Whether our intellect knows singulars?](https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FP/FP086.html#FPQ86A1THEP1)). – Geremia Aug 25 '20 at 18:32
  • @RajanAggarwal "_Isnt 'essence' of a substance not just assumed here implicitly?_" Substances are first in the order of being, but sensing accidents comes before in the order of our knowing being. (Similarly, causes exist, even though we know effects first. In the process of discovering causes, we "assume" a cause exists for certain effects, until we've proven those effects show the cause exists.) – Geremia Aug 25 '20 at 18:45
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    @RajanAggarwal "_specific differences (accidents if you will)_" Specific differences ≠ accidents. Accidents are signs of specific differences. Accidents inhere in a substance by definition. ([_Accidere_](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?la=la&l=accedere) means "to fall/come to", in the sense that accidents attach onto a substance.) – Geremia Aug 25 '20 at 18:45
  • @RajanAggarwal A really good book related to this topic is Brain Kemple's [Ens Primum Cognitum _in Thomas Aquinas and the Tradition: The Philosophy of Being as First Known_](https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=7274) (2017). – Geremia Aug 25 '20 at 18:47
  • Okay I think it's my mistake I stretched the discussion too far. I'd like to ask you a simple question - what is the difference between Quality and Differentia? – Rajan Aggarwal Aug 25 '20 at 20:15
  • The discussion is now out of my scope. The difference I understood between differentia and Quality (from this answer) is that differentia are a part of an essence of a substance whereas Quality is accidental. If I am right in saying this, I will have to say that "essence" as a thing to be preserved is being preserved for no reason. The relation between essential and accidental differences is also of no use to me. I don't see any fruit in distinguishing essential differences and accidental differences at all. What is the ultimate reason for this distinction in Aristotle? – Rajan Aggarwal Aug 26 '20 at 10:17
  • @RajanAggarwal "_'essence' as a thing to be preserved is being preserved for no reason._" Essence is what makes something be what it is. "_What is the ultimate reason for this distinction in Aristotle?_" Ultimately, it explains change. When something changes accidentally, the substance remains during the change. When something changes substantially, the substance of one thing is replaced by that of another. – Geremia Aug 26 '20 at 20:51
  • "When something changes accidentally, the substance remains during the change". I guess so, but it's not rationalised very well anywhere. For eg, water changes to ice - you can say it remains the same and its accidental properties change, but it'll still be unjustified. All you can justifiably say is there was water, and then there was ice. To say it's a substance which is still being preserved doesn't sound justifiable. – Rajan Aggarwal Aug 27 '20 at 16:03
  • Again, you are assuming there is such a thing as an essence implicitly during change - when water changes to ice you are not considering ice and water as two separate perceptions. You are implicitly adding that behind both of them there is a substance of some particular essence. This argument is circular. You're seeing change in terms of essense and then arguing for an essense. – Rajan Aggarwal Aug 27 '20 at 16:05