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If it can be known it cannot be communicated.

Seemingly Gorgias held an ability to be communicated as intrinsic to the reality of a concept. And why not? Since for a solipsist there would be no problem in being the only one to comprehend something... (But here already is a hint at the paradox at hand: For why wouldn't I have all the figments of my imagination, or even one, grasp my thinking?)

However for the not-so-solipsist we must conclude some kind of a democracy of ideas: if I cannot communicate my idea, if I cannot get another to comprehend it; then I am likely confused, I have in mind a non-concept.

But then communication has two sides, and maybe it isn't me that is lacking. There are manifestly different levels of comprehensive capacity. Still, we always find some means to communicate the real... Does this not mean that only what is inconceivable, is ultimately incommunicable? And what validates the contents of the communication, as real, is the comprehending of that communication? (Lies are prior concepts arranged improperly)

Now I have a dilemma, if the world stubbornly refuses to comprehend, even if I've laid it out in plain English: Is it my comprehension or the concept; am I clear or confused; is it me or my message or my audience; is it capacity or comprehension? What is wrong? Is the concept real? And what if the audience is just me?

Question: Has this paradox been named or discussed elsewhere?

If you can't see the paradox, then you see the paradox!

christo183
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  • It seems you are struggling with the idea of a concept that a single individual privately comprehends. According to Wittgenstein it is not that the individual might be confused, but that the very idea of private comprehension is incoherent, comprehension is ultimately a side effect of communication, see the [private language argument](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_language_argument). – Conifold May 18 '19 at 08:56
  • Knew you were gonna bring _him_ into it. And indeed I suspected this had something to do with PLA. But here's the thing, if comprehension is a side effect of communication then upon failing to communicate an idea, how can I know whether I'm confused given that I can communicate the idea internally? – christo183 May 18 '19 at 09:22
  • *Ultimately* a side effect, there are obvious private uses of public language. Failure to communicate here and there does not mean the idea is private in Wittgenstein's sense. His point is rather that communicability is guaranteed in principle by the nature of its carrier, language broadly speaking. Wittgenstein developed his therapy to weed out misuses of language that trap thought. As for the practical question in a specific case, it is resolved by practical means. Develop the idea, link it to others, talk to experts, try, try again. The confusion may not be related to a misuse of language. – Conifold May 18 '19 at 09:43
  • @Conifold It is precisely in the failure of language that the problem arise. Does a concept only become real when it is successfully communicated? Does the "paradox" in this question exist before someone else comprehends my communication? Of course I may be confused, and failing to communicate should prove this fact: that I had in mind a misconception. But in this very tension of the pre-communication apprehension of and post-communication negation of it, herein lies the "proof": of paradox itself. – christo183 May 18 '19 at 17:08
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    I am getting the feeling that the "paradox" results from mixing conceptual and pragmatic sense of failure. Failing to communicate does not necessarily indicate confusion of the kind associated with a failure of language as such. One can simply be a bad communicator, and use it clumsily (as many famous mathematicians are reported to do). Concepts do not "become real" only when communicated any more than a tree in the forest does when somebody sees it. To prove a failure of language one has to perform analysis and demonstrate that it is misused (as Wittgenstein does in his beetle example, etc.) – Conifold May 18 '19 at 18:52
  • @Conifold The failure to communicate is only where the trouble starts. After unsuccessfully trying to convey a concept the usual suspect would be the use of language. But sender and receiver of the message may form diverging opinions of "what's wrong", i.e. the receiver may hold the sender to be confused and the sender may doubt the receiver's capacity to comprehend. In practice people keep trying to instill comprehension in the other, or eventually give up; but in trying to specify a general rule or algorithm to decide this, is where thought I saw the "paradox of comprehension". – christo183 May 20 '19 at 12:15
  • I am not sure the use of language is the usual suspect, it is more of a suspect of last resort, and often only when the matters are abstract and subtle. The assumption we start with is that the failure is practical, and mendable. That would be close to what Davidson calls the [principle of charity](https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/817/574), and his methodology of interpretation might be along the lines of what you are looking for. See also his [triangulation theory](https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/donald-davidsons-triangulation-argument-a-philosophical-inquiry/). – Conifold May 20 '19 at 18:32
  • @Conifold Indeed the most common suspect is the usually the other person, except among the more rigorous. Davidson is quite interesting for several reasons, thanks! Triangulation would seem to have some sort of link to Wittgenstein? Still not sure if there is a paradox to comprehension, but it doesn't seem to have very meaningful effect... – christo183 May 21 '19 at 13:37
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    Yes, but who is to blame is really moot. What matters is the initial reaction, and (before frustration sets in) it is typically trying to re-explain "in other words", adding examples and background, *not* assuming that what one is trying to get across is a pseudo-thought. Davidson is Quine's student, and both approaches can be broadly characterized as implementing "meaning is use", but Davidson believes that much less sociality is sufficient than Wittgenstein. Triangulation is about meaning shared in a one on one interaction rather than one embedded into an entire social practice. – Conifold May 22 '19 at 08:07

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