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Quine propagated forward an approach to epistemology wherein there was no need of any sort of justification "beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method" (Quine 1981).

Quine is going after a foundationalist view of knowledge acquisition then, wherein one can attain knowledge only in a context of possessing some prior, more certain knowledge.

But while any anti-foundationalist might agree with him here, they might not agree with Quine that there is no certain knowledge period.

That is to say, there seems to be a gap between admitting that all knowledge is based on experience, or "observation and the hypothetico-deductive method", and admitting that all knowledge is uncertain.

How does Quine effectively cross that gap?

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  • Hi. It's not clear why you think there is a gap. Can you be more specific on this? – Ram Tobolski Jul 29 '16 at 21:42
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    @RamTobolski I think there is a gap insofar as an account of 'knowledge acquisition' is of a different category than an account of 'what knowledge consists in'. Quine is very concerned with methodology about knowledge, but I see less effort put forward to questions about the criterion of what qualifies as knowledge to begin with. Quine himself seemed to acknowledge purposely avoiding offering any sort of stated criterion. – Mos Jul 29 '16 at 22:08
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    For example, a reductionist materialist answering how we come to know will include a set of various material facts each considered under the aspect of how they culminate in whatever material fact is meant to be our knowledge, whereas the reductionist will give only this last material fact in answer to the question of what our knowledge is specifically. This is but one example of how each account is different. In any case the two are distinct to begin with by the distinct questions they are concerned with. – Mos Jul 29 '16 at 22:24
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    Even if the answer is the same to both questions, that they are different questions should reveal to us that we cannot assume an account of the methodology of a thing is the same as answering ehat the thing is itself, unless we make that assumption beforehand – Mos Jul 29 '16 at 22:30
  • how do you get to certain knowledge without a certain foundation? Revelation? –  Jul 30 '16 at 22:33
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    @mobileink No. Aristotelian empiricists would contend that the answer lies in 'abstraction', that the experiences we have are not in themselves void of an essence or intellibility since the world is intelligible. It is the opposite of the Kantian's middle way; instead of saying the order of the world consists in the mind, the Aristotelian says it consists in the uniformity of the world itself, there to be understood by a mind which has the ability to be intelligent. – Mos Aug 01 '16 at 00:26
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    But that is only one example of how one might provide an empiricist based account of how necesarry truths might come to be known. In any case, the point still seems to hold that prima facie points made about knowledge acquisition do not lead directly to conclusions about knowledge simpliciter without further qualification. That we cannot provide an account of how we *come to know something* in some regard does not mean we do not know said something in said regard. – Mos Aug 01 '16 at 00:48
  • Quine becomes a thorough empiricist after publishing his famous Two Dogmas, so the source the knowledge for him is nothing but sensual experiences. Holding foundationalist's knowledge acquisition may be his earlier rationalism stance. So these two classic epistemic POVs help him cross the gap... – Double Knot Jun 11 '21 at 05:32
  • I believe the OP's doubt originates from a misunderstsnding of Quine, assuming Quine's epistemology is scientific. – Agent Smith May 14 '23 at 05:55

2 Answers2

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That is to say, there seems to be a gap between admitting that all knowledge is based on experience, or "observation and the hypothetico-deductive method", and admitting that all knowledge is uncertain

The answer to that would come from his doctrine of meaning holism, first expounded in the last section of his famous essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", Empiricism without the Dogmas.

Meaning holism holds that the distinction between analytic and contingent propositions is a matter of degree. Analytic propositions, including the theorems of logic, are simply propositions that are recalcitrant to the test of further experience, but are in principle revisable. Contingent propositions, of which there are many gradations, are closer to the tribunal of experience.

Quine uses the analogy of a "web of belief" to illustrate this view, in which beliefs hold together with some measure of coherence. Beliefs closer to the center are more dependent on other beliefs, whereas beliefs closer to the boundary of experience are more dependent on experiential/empirical input. To give an example: If I believe that there are three trees in my backyard, that statement is more easily revisable from experience than my other belief that matter consists of fields of force. The former statement contains terms that get their meaning more from perceptual input, whereas the latter statement contains terms that are lodged in complex theoretical schemes.

That is to say, both statements get their meanings from both experience and other terms (intesionality), but one is by gradation more easily revisable than the latter because it's meaning is less theoretically dependent than the latter. Both are, in principle, revisable but to revise the first we need to adjust very few other beliefs, while to revise the second we'd have to adjust many other beliefs that hold theoretically together.

Logic, in this picture, is more or less a formalization of broad-scale invariances that are also indirectly dependent on experience/empirical input. That is, everything hinges on the cleavage of the web of belief to the perceptual boundary, but the deeper in the web beliefs are lodged, the harder to revise they are, because they depend on chains of beliefs and interdependent conceptual schemas.

You may find this characterization of logic unsatisfactory. If so, tell me why and I can try to explain how Quine would answer to the best of my ability and to the extent of my knowledge of Quine.

I hope this somewhat answers your question!

Angjelin Hila
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It's not entirely clear what you're asking or what gap you're referring to. W. V. Quine's approach to epistemology, known as naturalized epistemology, focuses on the role of science and observation in the acquisition of knowledge. According to Quine, knowledge is not acquired through a priori justification or some sort of foundational set of beliefs, but rather through the scientific method and the observation of the world around us. In this sense, Quine's approach is anti-foundationalist, as it denies the existence of any kind of certain, foundational knowledge.

Yoel Schvarcz
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