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Consider the sentence "It might be dark outside". Is this a proposition? What sorts of arguments could you make that this sentence isn't a proposition?

Is it that it is making -- potentially -- a claim about the states of affairs of other worlds (as opposed to the actual world) and hence can't be a claim about the actual world and hence can't be a proposition? (Genuine question here).

Basically, I'm trying to understand the view which states "not all sentences have propositional semantics; indeed, many of them just express properties of attitudes".

George
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  • According to writers like Kratzer, propositions such as *it might be dark outside* are only interpretable according to the evidence that you have. If you're outside and it's daylight, then when I say "It might be dark outside" you'll say it's false - but if you have the same evidence as me, you'll say it's true, if you think it's a possibility. Kratzers take would be that it's true if it accords with the evidence a speaker has. If this holds then it undermines, I suppose, the idea that *it might be dark outside* is a proposition as opposed to just a reflection of a speaker's epistemic state. – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 13 '14 at 02:11
  • But then couldn't we just take "It might be dark outside" to be equivalent to "It is consistent with such-and-such's evidence that it is dark outside". And wouldn't THAT be a proposition? – George Oct 13 '14 at 02:14
  • Erm, good point! Let me think for a second. Any thoughts, while I'm thinking about it, on my answer to your question here [Grice](http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/16359/understanding-grices-theory-of-non-natural-meaning/17507#17507) I'll delete this comment in a little while! – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 13 '14 at 02:24
  • Well, I suppose that's an argument, but it poses the following problem. If you're outside and it's broad daylight and I'm inside and for one reason or another darkness is compatible with my evidence, why is it you can disagree with my statement? If my statement actually consists of a proposition about my epistemic state then you shouldn't be able to say. *That's not true!*. Also stealing your useful computer thingie, suppose a computer only spits out "It might be/can't be/isn't dark outside" statements. It seems to me you could say they were true/false even though they're not evidence based .. – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 13 '14 at 02:32
  • Then alter the proposition as follows: "It is consistent with an ideal knowledge source's evidence [defined in such-and-such a way] that it is dark outside". The definition of the ideal knowledge source could allow it to make sense to disagree with other's declarations. Then this, too, might just be a proposition. – George Oct 13 '14 at 17:23
  • Erm, lets'see. Well, the problem is that you standing outside in the sunshine -you've got the ideal evidence. However, it wouldn't be ok for you to say "It might be dark outside" despite your perfect evidence! Or even "It might be sunny" – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 15 '14 at 16:40
  • @Araucaria, Related: [CWA and OWA](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-world_assumption). – Pacerier Mar 06 '15 at 09:57

3 Answers3

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Propositions are moves in a language game that intends to describe things. They have truth value, in the sense that what they propose is meant to be considered as an assertion describing reality. But there are other language-games, which are not primarily concerned with this task.

Statements of possibility are generally not informative. They are moves in the game of thinking itself, or in some sub-game about thinking, like auditing understanding. They inject a parameter over the range of possible worlds, and request that one's listener consider whether the parameter with possibility has been considered adequately. In doing so, they generally put you farther from certainty (correct or otherwise) rather than closer to it.

They are not even informative statements about alternative worlds. When would one say "It might be dark."? Not when one thinks this is information the listener does not have. If he did not know of this possibility, he would need a lot more information about the nature of light, in order to care. And any of that information would be more useful to contribute. Instead one says this when one thinks the plans so far do not adequately consider that dimension.

Since they do not cover descriptive ground, but instead open new ground, they do not contribute directly to understanding in the same way. So such statements do not play the role propositions are meant to fulfill. It is possible to interpret them as propositions, but doing so does not allow them to perform their intended function. If someone contributes "It might be dark." and your only response is to affirm the possibility, he has failed to communicate.

(Answering Pacerier's silly question, if Mary asks whether it is dark outside, and John replies that it might be, he is agreeing that he had not to that point considered whether or not it was, and whether it should have any effects. He might only be so agreeing in excessive politeness, if he is fairly sure it does not matter.)

  • Base on your answer, if Mary asks "Is it dark outside?" and John replies "It might be dark", what does John mean? How should Mary interpret the reply? – Pacerier Oct 10 '14 at 19:52
  • That is the very rare situation in which your answer would apply. He is hundreds of times more likely to use this phrase when it it not an answer to a question and hundreds of times more likely to answer "I don't know' than give this answer. You are acting as though information exchange is the only reason to say things. So you are framing this in a totally unnatural way. The more likely setup is when there is no question, and someone says the phrase, expecting you to check your logic. –  Oct 10 '14 at 20:27
  • It's not rare to ask someone the question "Is it dark outside?" Indeed, my example use case is no less common nor contrived than your example use case. And also, Meaning exchange **is the only reason** to say things to others. Every utterance sent to a receiver has an intended meaning by the sender. – Pacerier Oct 10 '14 at 21:36
  • It is rare AS I STATED for the phrase in question to be considered an answser. One is much more likely to simply admit one does not know, than to tell the listener something they are already perfectly aware of. After all, who would ask the question if they did not know that it might have either answer? –  Oct 13 '14 at 14:39
  • @Pacerier I prefer Wittgenstein over you. There are multiple games, and propositional information is only one. Co-ordination of actions with others is a separate use of language. –  Oct 13 '14 at 14:44
  • If you want to find a meaning exchange behind this statement it is usually 'I believe you have not adequately considered whether or not it might be dark outside.' and not a reflection of the actual or potential state in question. –  Oct 13 '14 at 15:18
  • One is free to treat things like 'sit down' as propositions and create objects corresponding to my will, etc. But will, obligation, possibility etc. do not act like normal objects, they are whole other domains of discourse than objective reality, and embedding them into propositional structures creates silly conflicting quantification problems -- "Do you want not to want that? Then, do you really want it? Or does some part of you not want it? Does that allow you to be considered as a single agent?" –  Oct 13 '14 at 15:33
  • Do note that many philosophers disagree with Wittgenstein's concept of language games. [**edited by mod**] – Pacerier Oct 17 '14 at 17:09
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A proposition is-equal any message that has a "truth value". Consider this sentence:

"It might be dark outside".

Does it have a "truth value"? If yes, then it's a proposition. If no, then it's not.

The first step is to identify the meaning of John's message. It's important to understand that the exact same words can have different meanings depending on context.

Consider this scenario:

Mary asks:

Is it dark outside?

John replies:

It might be dark outside.

whereby John meant:

It might be dark outside. Maybe it is. Maybe it isn't. I don't know.

then John is not making a claim regarding the "darkness of outside". He is claiming that he has no knowledge of the "darkness of outside". Since that has a truth value —could either be true xor false—, the message is a proposition; not a proposition regarding the "darkness of outside", but a proposition regarding John's (own) knowledge.

However, if John meant:

It might be dark outside. There is a chance that it is dark outside. (There is above zero probability that it is dark outside).

then John's message is a proposition regarding the "darkness of outside". It has a "truth value":

  • It is true if there is above zero probability that it is dark outside.

  • It is false if there is exactly zero probability —no chance— that it is dark outside.

  • It must be either true or false.

If we tweak the scenario and change John's reply to:

It might be dark outside, but so what?

whereby John meant:

I don't care if it's dark outside. Why do I need to care?

then John's message is not proposition because it is a question and it can neither be true nor false.

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Pacerier
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  • Yes, but someone who is asserting that it might or might not be dark outside is not usually indicating that they do not know. They are usually indicating that you may have omitted this consideration from your prior deductions. They are injecting a parameter on the set of possible worlds into your frame of reference for consideration. So interpreting this as a proposition that the speaker is uncertain is not in keeping with the meaning. It is a move in a different kind of game: one of care-taking you or auditing your reliability. Not one describing the world. –  Oct 09 '14 at 22:53
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    @jobermark, As I've mentioned, the context determines everything. I've created 3 example scenarios to demonstrate that the exact same words can mean different things in different context. You can inject another example scenario and the same words will mean something else altogether as you've mentioned. – Pacerier Oct 10 '14 at 01:26
  • The point, I guess is that this is not generally an answer, but a spontaneous, helpful suggestion. So you are spending most of your answer on highly unlikely cases. Your last case touches on the most common case obliquely, but it dismisses it as a question, when it isn't one. It is in effect a polite request for action -- "please review your decision in light of this information (which I am not conveying, but already know that you know)". –  Oct 10 '14 at 17:33
  • @jobermark, I don't actually understand your comment. What exactly is this "common case" that you are talking about? Also, who is making the suggestion — John or Mary? – Pacerier Oct 10 '14 at 19:43
  • The common case is when you are in the middle of planning an outing, and someone says "It might be dark outside", so you take a flashlight. It is seldom given as the answer to a specific question. Having it be an answer is an unusual framing of the phrase. Come on, man, think about when you have heard a similar phrase, and pick the most common case! –  Oct 10 '14 at 20:23
  • Requests for action do not have truth value. This phrase is, in general, a request for mental action, and not an attempt to convey information. –  Oct 10 '14 at 20:35
  • @jobermark, No I've not even thought of that use case because it's not even natural for someone to say "It might be dark outside" in that situation. Indeed people who have not read your comment will not know what's that "common use case" you are iterating about in your answer below. And in your example it's odd for "It might be dark outside" to be interpreted as a request for action. The utterance seems more to be an intrapersonal communication and not a request to any particular person. – Pacerier Oct 10 '14 at 21:36
  • A request for group action is still a request for action. Review your actual experience. Every time you work with other people someone is likely to say 'X might Y' and mean that the group as a whole should focus temporarily on making sure it has incorporated that consideration into its shared thinking. –  Oct 13 '14 at 14:37
  • @Parcerier If you don't think this usage is natural, watch any procedural drama, where people work in groups. You cannot go ten minutes without encountering the spontaneous contribution of a 'might' statement. Situations parallel to your framing are few and far between, and they occur either as jokes, or as symbols of arrogance or excessive formality (Bones confirms that might statements thrown at her are true before expounding upon them, which is just Aspergery.) –  Oct 13 '14 at 17:36
  • There *is* no objective probability of it being dark outside. There's only the probability that it's dark on the evidence you have. If you're standing outside with your eyes open - it's either 100% or 0%! So the 'truth value' based on the existence of a probability's a bit problematic. "Above zero probability" can't objectively mean anything, can it? – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 14 '14 at 15:01
  • @Araucaria, Even if you're standing outside with your eyes open and you see darkness, folks like Popper, Zhuangzi and Plato will say that it's wrong for you to claim that your knowledge that it's dark outside is 100% correct. It's always a probability. – Pacerier Oct 17 '14 at 17:08
  • @jobermark, And you need to realise that procedural drama is only a small part of life. A very small part of **life**. The situations I've mentioned are not "few and far between". They are just as likely to happen as the situations you've mentioned. – Pacerier Oct 17 '14 at 17:09
  • Yes, quite agree - but there's no *objective* probability, that was the point of my comment really. But on your definition and Popper's assesssment of probability - every *might* sentence is true! – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 17 '14 at 17:16
  • @Araucaria, And we don't know if your claim *"every might sentence is true"* is true or not because we don't know the truth and can't compare your claim against it. It might be that the claim "your claim *'every might sentence is true'* might be false" is true. – Pacerier Oct 17 '14 at 17:36
  • Referencing drama is a more objective way of measuring language usage than subjective experience. I am not claiming this is a big part of life, but that team work IS a big part of MOST PEOPLE's lives, and that art would capture the language in a fair way. Things are not as subjective as you insist. English has a statistically common usage, and most drama would represent that reasonably. –  Oct 17 '14 at 17:40
  • If "it might be false" is true, it's because every *might* sentence is trivially true on the objective evidence definition. And ... if we've turned every *might* sentence into a trivially true sentence - then it's probably fair to say that *might* sentences don't constitute propositions! :) – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 17 '14 at 17:43
  • @Araucaria I would agree. All modally suspended propositions are only uttered (as intended statements) when they are true. "I would like you to listen" is not uttered when false. "The next car I see might be periwinkle" could be false if cars were simply not made in that color ever in history. But it would not be stated when it were false in the intended domain. So if someone says it, they may mean a domain broader than experienced reality. But they are considering a domain where it is true. –  Oct 17 '14 at 17:45
  • @Araucaria, The claim "every might-sentence is trivially true on the objective evidence definition" is clearly false. The objective evidence definition does not state that every might-sentence is true; what it states is that our knowledge is limited and hence it's **unknown** if every might-sentence is true or not. – Pacerier Oct 17 '14 at 18:21
  • @jobermark, **1)** Notice a strawman in your first line? You just changed "procedural drama" to "all drama". My claim is "procedural drama" is only a small part of life. Do not insert a strawman there. "Team work is a big part of most people's lives" does not prove that Wittgensteins concept of language games is true. There is................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ – Pacerier Oct 17 '14 at 18:25
  • .............................................................................................................no reason why "concept of language games is false" cannot co-exist with "team work is a big part of most people's lives" as they are orthogonal concepts. My claim is not that the world is subjective, but that your opinions are. English has a statistically common usage and yet your opinions are still subjective opinions. Back your claims with evidence, not with more claims. **2)** Define 'modally suspended propositions'. – Pacerier Oct 17 '14 at 18:26
  • Do you see the straw man you project everyone on to. I did not claim any such proof. I claimed drama makes a fair sample of English. I pointed you at a subgenre as a helpful suggestion, not as some logical limitation on my statement. –  Oct 17 '14 at 18:26
  • Modally suspended propositions are propositions that are modified by being placed into a 'mood'. They involve modal markers like 'should' or 'might'. They are not straightforward propositions, because they involve data outside objective reality for resolution. –  Oct 17 '14 at 18:28
  • Evidence: I have heard my usage seven times today, and yours once in the last week. Do you have equal evidence this is unusual? Like I said, I ran the experiments I asked you to run. Fair is fair. Back your claims with something less evasive. –  Oct 17 '14 at 18:31
  • @Pacerier No: it says that if there is above zero probability that the embedded sentence is true, it's true. The probability that something is true, is the probability that it's true according to the evidence that we have . Given our Popperian agnosticism about any particular proposition being 100% accurate, there is no way that our evidence against a proposition - under the scope of *might* - being false is ever going to be 100%. Therefore the probability of it being false is never going to be 100%, and therefore by the definition given such a *might* sentence will be true. – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 17 '14 at 18:34
  • Basically, modal suspension protects the statement from validation. There is bound to be some morality in which I should spit in my co-worker's coffee. There is bound to be some alternate framing where is might be dark at mid-day tomorrow. If I say I would like something, I can make myself like it, at least for a short period of time. So modally suspended statements lack truth value unless they are carefully bounded into a meaning-giving framework. ("According to Augustine one should...") –  Oct 17 '14 at 18:36
  • Instead of conveying meaning, these kinds of statements act upon other people in more indirect ways, for instance making them feel obligated, or moving them to care about me, or asking them to broaden the framing in which they have considered a statement... When I reply to "Is it dark" with "It might be" I am indicating "I have not considered that. I could. Should I?" I am entertaining whether the additional framing has relevance. –  Oct 17 '14 at 18:40
  • I might quickly decide "No. I shouldn't" and that becomes your last case. I might decide I should have but didn't, and the statement becomes something of an apology. Etc. But giving the consideration is the point of the construction. –  Oct 17 '14 at 18:48
  • Wittgenstein may not be the way you, personally, would choose to capture this, but if you have a better framing, I have not heard it. The framing in terms of probability seems like an evasion. On what are we to base that probability? And did the speaker actually envision some numerical comparison? I doubt it. So it might sometimes be a model, but it fails to really capture human behavior. –  Oct 17 '14 at 19:09
  • @Araucaria, That's not correct because you are assuming that our future knowledge will never be 100%. However, there's no proof to that. Even though our current knowledge is nowhere near 100%, our future knowledge may be 100%. Note that "future" here really means in the *future*, a period including the time period after our human lives. So allow me to correct your previous statement (the bolded words ................................................................................... – Pacerier Oct 29 '14 at 13:39
  • ........................................ will show the correction): The probability that something is true **to you**, is the probability that it's true according to the evidence that **you currently** have . Given **your** Popperian agnosticism about any particular proposition being 100% accurate **according to your current knowledge**, there is no way that **your** evidence against a proposition being false is going to be 100% **currently**. Therefore the probability of it being false **will currently not** be 100%, and therefore by the definition given such a might sentence will be true. – Pacerier Oct 29 '14 at 13:39
  • @jobermark, **3)** Your previous claim is that **procedural** drama is a fair sample of English. Quote from you: *" If you don't think this usage is natural, watch any **procedural** drama, where people work in groups."* So now defend your claim instead of trying to twist it from " **procedural** drama" to "drama" ................................................................. – Pacerier Oct 29 '14 at 13:40
  • ................................... **4)** Your so-called "evidence" doesn't even pass the laughing test. Show us some **real** statistical evidence tested through a **significant percentage** of the English-speaking population. **5)** Precede your comments with "@user" so that we know which user your last 4 comments are directed to, as there are at least 2 other beings in the comment-conversation besides you. – Pacerier Oct 29 '14 at 13:41
  • @Pacerier Not quite, I don't think. Given that we can call into doubt even our very existence, we will never lose our Popperian doubt about anything - whatever the evidence. However, it might be worth bearing in mind, that my point originally was that in relation to *might* sentences - there is no objective probability that it is dark outside, there's only probability according to the evidence John has. You can't give the sentence a truth value based on the probability of it being true! – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 29 '14 at 16:03
  • @Araucaria, We can only call into doubt our very existence because of the fact that we do not currently possess 100% knowledge. However, unless you have 100% knowledge, you are also unable to assert that "we will never lose our Popperian doubt about anything". You cannot, because ...................................................................... – Pacerier Oct 29 '14 at 20:48
  • ............................................... when you do not possess 100% knowledge, you must doubt *that* very thing that you assert. Similarly, we cannot assert that there is no objective reality out there, simply because we do not have 100% knowledge. John, with his limited knowledge, can only speak of a probability. However, a being with 100% knowledge will not be speaking of probabilities but certainties. A sentence has a truth value if it can be true, or if it can be false. Your knowledge of whether it's true or false does not affect its truthness nor the existence of its truth value. – Pacerier Oct 29 '14 at 20:49
  • 1) You can't felicitously say that something might happen if you know it has. 2) Knowing what has happened retrospectively after you're dead doesn't help you say anything with a truth value whilst you're alive. 3) That was my point in the first place - if you can't know something is true, then you don't know that anything's false, so all *might* sentences are trivially true. – Araucaria - Not here any more. Oct 29 '14 at 22:54
  • @Araucaria, 1) Your first point exactly explains why it's not true that all *might*-sentences are true: If you *know* something has happened, then it *might* not happen is false, and if you *know* something has not happened, then it *might* happen is false. 2) You are confusing retrospective knowledge with definite knowledge. I had been talking about definite knowledge, not retrospective knowledge. 3) Your third point is ........................................................................................... – Pacerier Oct 30 '14 at 06:56
  • ................................... false because Even if you can't know if something is true, it doesn't mean that someone else couldn't know it. A *might*-sentence will be false when there's at least one being knowing that it's false. Consider the classic [Schrödinger's Cat](http://goo.gl/fUfiDJ) problem: The cat is dead/alive, true or false? If there exists a being who know **with 100% certainty** that the cat is alive, then saying that "the cat *might* be dead" is false because according to that being's **definite knowledge**, there is **exactly zero probability** that the cat can be dead. – Pacerier Oct 30 '14 at 06:57
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I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of the excluded middle. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise. They are redundancies or unwanted baggage that result from our methods of formalization. One might say they are artefacts. We begin with what we are given, and we then generate our propositions. We do not generate our laws of thought.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

nwr
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    I'm confused. Are you stating that "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" cannot be a proposition? A tautology is one of the most basic types of propositions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tautology_%28logic%29) – virmaior Jun 07 '15 at 04:21
  • @virmaior You're probably correct. The wiki entry on **proposition** states one view that " Propositions are the sharable objects of attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions, including thought- and utterance-tokens which are not sharable, and concrete events or facts, which cannot be false." Since the OP was looking for a justification for ruling out the possibility of the statement being a proposition, I thought this might be one way of doing so. – nwr Jun 07 '15 at 04:52
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    The claim "facts are not propositions" could use some more explanation, if you ask me. If, by your definition, propositions are bearers of truth and falsity, how can something that is true (a fact) not be a proposition? –  Jun 07 '15 at 07:24
  • @virmaior I have edited my answer to include some justification for my response. It may sound a bit weaselly, but it is the best I can do currently. – nwr Jun 07 '15 at 17:49
  • @Keelan I have edited my answer in an attempt to provide some justification. I hope it is more satisfactory. – nwr Jun 07 '15 at 17:51
  • @virmaior I take back my "weaselly" comment (above). I'm happy with my edit and don't think it is weaselly. To be honest, I'm not even sure I know what *weaselly* means. – nwr Jun 07 '15 at 19:27
  • My sense is that "facts are not propositions" is something Wittgenstenian in any meaning, but it's not something in my specialization, so I would open to hearing a justification for it. – virmaior Jun 08 '15 at 00:29
  • @virmaior Regarding my claim that facts are not propositions, would you agree that a proposition is a formal object, while a fact is not. Less clearly, there are many proposition which express the same fact. My unsophisticated understanding of Wittgenstein is that he rejected *all* propositions. I don't wish to go that far. For me, we formulate propositions in order to identify facts. – nwr Jul 19 '15 at 17:41
  • I'm not super clear on the use of the term "formal object," but I take it that's some sort of an observational / metaphysical distinction. It's rather difficult to show that these aren't just two *forms* of formalization, one as applied to the organization of thoughts and the other as applied to the organization of world but that depends how deep down the epistemology rabbit hole we want to go. – virmaior Jul 20 '15 at 10:03