A restriction on an action-language

Question

Suppose that it is possible to "construct" a language where individual virtuous actions can make a referential contribution, sequentially in concerto, so that different patterns are interpretable as questions, commands, and assertions of their own. Is it a restriction on such a language that individual actions (by type) correspond to an "alphabet" first, so that by using this "alphabet" the more truth-functionally referring expressions are formed?

This is why I think there might be such a restriction:

1. If individual virtuous actions were used as the equivalent of words, then they would presumably end up corresponding to themselves by type. To an extent, this would be unavoidable for the virtue of honesty (perhaps), but if every good/right action expressed a concept just as-a-whole, then how would we use this deontic language to refer to vicious choices?^†

2. So it would be easier to use moral actions "alphabetically," because then the concatenated reference for whole words can be made independent on some "moral onomatopoeia" of the first-order virtuous actions. Again, with respect to honesty, there seems to be a trivial-collapse moment in the system, though (using an act of honesty as a symbol to use to make an action-semiotic statement that should itself be made honestly seems the unavoidable purpose of such an arrangement).

Are there other ways to use moral actions as individual symbolic/referential "terms," besides "alphabetically" or with each moral action serving as a full "word"?

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^†On the other hand, maybe this would allow for a bizarre theory of weakness-of-will and Socrates' thesis (about virtue and knowledge): if the only way to "talk about" wrong actions, in the True Language (if you will), would be to perform wrong actions, and so too if only by doing right can one Talk about what's right, then what is impossible to the left is willing to speak to oneself in deontic Mentalese so as to archive one's belief that something is wrong in one's inner True Library, for this would mean that, to express the belief that something is wrong, one would Talk Truly about one's wrongdoing, by doing the very same wrong thing, which is (hopefully) absurd. Then what is possible to the right is choosing to Talk about doing the right thing, and if one never chooses to Talk about doing wrong, one would be able to stop doing anything wrong (a tall order, however).

Answer 1

First, let's consider your assertion that individual actions must correspond to an "alphabet" from which more complex expressions are formed. This is indeed one way to structure such a language, as it mirrors how most human languages work: individual symbols (letters) combine to form more complex symbols (words), which can then be combined into yet more complex expressions (sentences).

However, there might be alternative ways to structure this "moral language". For instance, consider the concept of ideograms, where each symbol represents a whole idea or concept. In the moral language, each action could potentially represent a whole moral concept or principle, like "honesty", "courage", "kindness", etc. Combining these actions could then represent more complex moral narratives or scenarios.

As for your concern about how to represent vicious actions in this language, one possibility is to use the absence or negation of virtuous actions. For example, an act of dishonesty could be represented by the absence or negation of the action-symbol for "honesty". This could be analogous to how negative statements are formed in many human languages.

One possible limitation of such a language could be the difficulty in discussing hypothetical or abstract moral scenarios. Since the language is based on actions, it might be challenging to represent scenarios that haven't actually occurred, or to discuss moral principles in the abstract without tying them to specific actions.