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Suppose we keep asking the question of "why" to reality's laws, seeking deeper and deeper explanations of them. Examples : "why do coupling constants take these values"? "why do the laws take these forms"? "why are there only three dimensions"?

As history has shown, sometimes we do get deeper explanations of the "whys". For example, today we can explain Coulomb's law using Quantum Field Theory. We can explain conservation using symmetries.

If we keep following the sequence of "whys", :

  1. We reach a dead end. "why" is no longer defined after a step.

  2. The logic becomes circular. The answer to some "why" is a previous step in the sequence.

  3. We're led to an infinitely deep staircase of "whys".

Are all of these options logically possible for our universe? Is there any option that's considered preferable and why? Are there other options considered too?

EDIT I think the circular universe is the only possibility. This is because, both "infinite staircase" and "circularity" are logical structures. So, you need the ideas of logic to define reality. But you need reality to define logic. So, both "reality" and "logic" circularly feed on each other's existence.

Or, let's say there's a dead-end which explains everything else, even logic. But then, defining the dead-end requires the application of sequences, i.e. logic. So, the reasoning is circular.

What if we take logic itself as the dead-end? But logic has no meaning without reality. Logic is real. It exists. So it can't be the explanation of reality.

Ryder Rude
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    These are the standard three options in any regress of justifications, see [Agrippa's trilemma](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma). The "dead end" is usually spun positively, as the "ultimate because". Logical possibility is a very weak condition, they are not self-contradictory so, trivially, logically possible. Believers in God or "theory of everything" argue for ultimate because; believers in "inexhaustibility of nature" for infinite regress; circularity ([coherentism](https://iep.utm.edu/coherentism-in-epistemology/#H2)) is relatively unpopular, but has its fans too. – Conifold Sep 01 '22 at 05:32
  • @Conifold I think the circular universe is the only possibility. This is because, both infinite staircase and circularity are logical structures. So, you need the ideas of logic to define reality. But you need reality to define logic. So, both "reality" and "logic" circularly feed on each others' existence. – Ryder Rude Sep 01 '22 at 06:04
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    I haven't heard the claim before that "since logic exists, logic cannot be the explanation for reality". It's a great argument. – Mozibur Ullah Sep 01 '22 at 06:39

2 Answers2

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This is a known problem in epistemology, the problem of infinite regress

The regress problem (also known as Agrippa's Trilemma) is the problem of providing a complete logical foundation for human knowledge. The traditional way of supporting a rational argument is to appeal to other rational arguments, typically using chains of reason and rules of logic. A classic example that goes back to Aristotle is deducing that Socrates is mortal. We have a logical rule that says All humans are mortal and an assertion that Socrates is human and we deduce that Socrates is mortal. In this example how do we know that Socrates is human? Presumably we apply other rules such as: All born from human females are human. Which then leaves open the question how do we know that all born from humans are human? This is the regress problem: how can we eventually terminate a logical argument with some statements that do not require further justification but can still be considered rational and justified?

There are various approaches to address this, not necessarily mutually exclusive:

Foundationalism

Foundationalists respond to the regress problem by asserting that certain "foundations" or "basic beliefs" support other beliefs but do not themselves require justification from other beliefs. These beliefs might be justified because they are self-evident, infallible, or derive from reliable cognitive mechanisms. Perception, memory, and a priori intuition are often considered possible examples of basic beliefs.

Coherentism

Another response to the regress problem is coherentism, which is the rejection of the assumption that the regress proceeds according to a pattern of linear justification. To avoid the charge of circularity, coherentists hold that an individual belief is justified circularly by the way it fits together (coheres) with the rest of the belief system of which it is a part. This theory has the advantage of avoiding the infinite regress without claiming special, possibly arbitrary status for some particular class of beliefs. Yet, since a system can be coherent while also being wrong, coherentists face the difficulty of ensuring that the whole system corresponds to reality. Additionally, most logicians agree that any argument that is circular is, at best, only trivially valid. That is, to be illuminating, arguments must operate with information from multiple premises, not simply conclude by reiterating a premise.

Infinitism

An alternative resolution to the regress problem is known as "infinitism". Infinitists take the infinite series to be merely potential, in the sense that an individual may have indefinitely many reasons available to them, without having consciously thought through all of these reasons when the need arises. This position is motivated in part by the desire to avoid what is seen as the arbitrariness and circularity of its chief competitors, foundationalism and coherentism. The most prominent defense of infinitism has been given by Peter Klein.

And combinations of the above:

Foundherentism

An intermediate position, known as "foundherentism", is advanced by Susan Haack. Foundherentism is meant to unify foundationalism and coherentism. Haack explains the view by using a crossword puzzle as an analogy. Whereas, for example, infinitists regard the regress of reasons as taking the form of a single line that continues indefinitely, Haack has argued that chains of properly justified beliefs look more like a crossword puzzle, with various different lines mutually supporting each other.[70] Thus, Haack's view leaves room for both chains of beliefs that are "vertical" (terminating in foundational beliefs) and chains that are "horizontal" (deriving their justification from coherence with beliefs that are also members of foundationalist chains of belief).

Personally I am of the opinion that a combination of the solutions (eg Foundherentism) might be the most appropriate. It may be the case that a set of epistemic facts can not be further analysed and have to be taken as simply given, and another set of facts (or even the same set) refer to each other at various levels, producing a coherent whole, supporting each other.

Nikos M.
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Spinoza would have dismissed using logic to charactetise realities. For him, logic is contingent.

Aristotle also argued that an infinite regress was an absurdity and posited a First Mover which later Christian, Muslim & Jewish thinkers identified with God.

Buddhist philosophy is probably closest to what you are suggesting with your "circular universe". Essentially they say things are so arranged that everything depends upon everything so everything "arises" or comes into being together.

Coherentism, though not named as such, is actually pretty popular when one looks at foundational thinking of all kinds since the principles at stake generally have to be coherent with each other. I'd advise against calling it "circular" as that term is often used pejoratively ad in "circular thinking".

There are also physical speculations such as eternal inflation which posits an eternal universe. But these are very much speculations with little or no evidence to substantiate them. The most popular cosmological theory is still the Big Bang. Though it has nothing to say about the Bang itself.

Mozibur Ullah
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  • What did you mean by "logic is contingent"? If we take God as the dead-end, God certainly does not explain logic. So, God can't be the dead end. And logic itself can't be the dead end either because it too is real. This is why I'm saying that coherentism between logic and reality is the only possibility – Ryder Rude Sep 01 '22 at 06:48
  • But, "coherence" itself is a logical term. So I think we're also having an infinite regress of coherentism, ad infinitum. – Ryder Rude Sep 01 '22 at 06:53
  • @Ryder Rude: "Logic is contingent" means it's not neccessary. Since Spinoza posits God as the only neccessary being this follows from his assumptions. – Mozibur Ullah Sep 01 '22 at 06:58
  • @Ryder Rude: Coherentism isn't a regress - it's merely coherent with itself. – Mozibur Ullah Sep 01 '22 at 07:00
  • But how does Spinoza define God, if not as the dead-end of causal sequences? Because if that's his definition, then he is assuming the existence of logic – Ryder Rude Sep 01 '22 at 07:11
  • @Ryder Rude: You should ask him! – Mozibur Ullah Sep 01 '22 at 07:58
  • Formally the mathematics of non-well founded sets can be a good way to think about circular metaphysical dependencies. – Avi C Sep 01 '22 at 22:41
  • Logical circularity, especially self reference, can lead to contradictions/paradoxes. However, it isn't clear if these can truly be avoided. In math and philosophy, the paradoxes get pushed to the edges with formal tricks like building an infinite hierarchy of types or meta-languages. But such approaches always leave some meta-frame where we simply aren't allowed to ask further questions. This leads me to think the circular appoach is ultimately needed even if it does generate some contradictions. – Avi C Sep 01 '22 at 22:49
  • @Avi C: Set theory has nothing to say about metaphysics. Its the other way around. Metaphysics has something to say about set theory. – Mozibur Ullah Sep 16 '22 at 11:48
  • @MoziburUllah Modern set theory just brings rigor to paradoxes of self-reference and paradoxes of the One and the many which have been discussed by metaphysicians since ancient times (Parmenides, Plato, etc). Any metaphysics must give an account of how things can be multiple (or if you are a monist, at least how things can appear to be multiple). Similarly, if you account for causes or metaphysical dependencies you need to say whether the chain of causes/reasons/dependencies can be circular. You can use formal mathematical languages to build models these metaphysical accounts. – Avi C Sep 18 '22 at 18:30
  • @Avi C: Set theory brings along a whole host of paradoxes of its own. Have you not heard of the infamous Russells Paradox? Set theory does not offer any kind of ontology as it is purely formal. For that to occur reference to the world must be made. And this is not often made especially after Hilberts formalist revolution. Ontology refers to the world not to sets. – Mozibur Ullah Sep 19 '22 at 23:47